Growth without governance by Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart
wp$  a  a2.
























































































































d|  POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2928
Abstract
It is well known that there  is a strong  positive correlation  Governance."  They document this evidence  using a
between per capita incomes and the quality  of  newly updated set of worldwide  governance-indicators
governance  across countries.  Kaufmann  and Kraay  covering  175 countries for the period 2000-01, and use
propose an empirical  strategy that allows  separation of  the results to interpret the relationship  between incomes
this correlation  into (1) a strong positive  causal  effect  and governance focusing  on the Latin America  and
running from better governance  to higher per capita  Caribbean region-within  a worldwide empirical
incomes, and, perhaps  surprisingly at first,  (2) a weak  context.  Finally, the authors speculate  about the
and even  negative causal  effect running  in the opposite  potential  importance  of elite influence  and state capture
direction  from per capita incomes  to governance.  in accounting  for the surprising negative effects of per
The first result confirms existing evidence  on the  capita  incomes on governance,  present some evidence  on
importance  of good  governance for economic  such capture  in some Latin American  countries, and
development.  The second result  is new  and suggests the  suggest priorities  for actions to improve governance
absence of a "virtuous circle"  in which  higher incomes  when such pernicious  elite influence shapes public
lead to further  improvements in  governance.  This  policy.
motivates the authors' choice  of title, "Growth Without
This paper-a joint product of the World Bank Institute and the Development Research  Group-is part of a larger effort
in the  Bank to generate and analyze worldwide  governance  indicators, assessing the manifestations  and consequences of
governance.  The full governance indicators dataset is available interactively at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/
govdata2001.htm.  Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.
Please  contact  Kevin  Morgan,  room  J3-273,  telephone  202-473-7798,  fax  202-676-9874,  email  address
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Massimo Mastrzi and Erin Farnand for assistance.Per  capita  income  and  the  quality  of governance  are  strongly  positively  correlated  across
countries.  We  propose  an  empirical  strategy  that  allows  us  to  separate  this  correlation  into  two
components:  a strong positive  causal effect running  from better governance to  higher per  capita  income
and a weak  and even negative  causal effect running  in the  opposite direction  from per capita  income to
governance.  The  first  result  confirms  existing  evidence  on  the  importance  of good  governance  for
economic development.  The  second result is  new and suggests the  absence  of virtuous circles,  in which
higher incomes  lead to further improvements  in governance.  This motivates  our choice  of title, "Growth
without  Governance."  We document  this evidence  using a  newly updated  set of worldwide  governance
indicators  covering  175  countries  for  the  period  2000-01,  and  we  use  the  results  to  interpret  the
relationship between  incomes and governance  in the Latin America and the Caribbean  region. Finally, we
speculate  as  to  the  potential  importance  of  elite  influence  and  state  capture  in  accounting  for  the
surprising negative effects of per capita income on governance, present evidence  on such capture  in some
Latin American countries, and suggest priorities  for actions to improve governance  when such pernicious
elite influence shapes public policy.
The  starting  point  of the  paper  is the  strong positive  correlation  between  various  measures  of
governance  and per  capita  income.  Figure  I plots the  relationship  between  governance  (on the vertical
axis)  and  log per capita  income (on the horizontal  axis)  in  a large  sample  of countries,  for six different
dimensions  of governance (see Annex 3 for all figures).  Per capita incomes are measured  in 1995,  in 1985
U.S.  dollars  adjusted  for  differences  in purchasing  power;  the  governance  indicators  refer to  the period
2000-01.  Since  initial  incomes  in  the  distant  past  are  not  very  different  across  countries,  the current
dispersion  in per capita incomes on the vertical axis reflects differences  in growth across countries  in the
very  long run. Figure  I can thus also be interpreted as illustrating the  relationship between  growth in  the
very long run and current institutional  quality.
Interestingly,  the  countries  in  the  Latin  American  and  Caribbean  region  display  striking
differences  in  performance  on  different  measures  of institutional  quality  relative  to  their  per  capita
incomes.  In  terms  of the  institutions  of political  accountability,  countries  in  Latin  America  and  the
Caribbean  fare well relative  to their per capita incomes, in the sense that a strong majority of countries in
the  region  lie  above  the  simple  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  regression  line  of  the  voice  and
accountability  measure  on per  capita  income. In  contrast,  most  countries  in the region  fare surprisingly
poorly  on  three  other  dimensions  of governance  (namely,  government  effectiveness,  rule  of law,  and
control  of corruption).  Finally,  for  the  last  two  dimensions  of governance  that  we  consider  (political
stability  and  regulatory  quality),  countries  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  are  fairly  evenly
distributed above and below the OLS regression  line. Table  1 summarizes these patterns by indicating the
proportion of the twenty-six countries  in the region  for which we have data that fall above and  below the
2regression  line.  The last column  also reports the p value associated  with the null hypothesis of a sign test
that countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are evenly distributed  above and below  the regression
line  for  the  entire  sample.  For  the  first  four  indicators  we  mention,  the  noted  patterns  are  strongly
statistically  significant  at conventional  levels,  with  Latin America and  the Caribbean  faring well in the
first indicator (political  accountability),  but poorly in the following three (government  effectiveness,  rule
of law and control of corruption).
Table 1. Governance and Per Capita Incomes in Latin America and the Caribbeana
Position relative to OLS regression  line
Measure of institutional quality  Below  Above  P  value
Voice and accountability  8  18  0.05
Political stability  11  15  0.43
Government effectiveness  19  7  0.02
Regulatory quality  10  16  0.24
Rule of law  20  6  0.01
Control of corruption  20  6  0.01
Overall  govermance  16  10  0.24
a  The first  two columns summarize the location of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean relative  to
the regression  line in a simple OLS regression of the indicated measure of governance  on log per capita
GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) in 1995. The final column reports the p value associated with a sign
test of the hypothesis that the proportions of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean falling above and
below the regression line are equal.
This  paper provides  an interpretation  of the  strong positive  correlation between  governance  and
per capita income shown in figure  1. The following section describes how we constructed the governance
indicators for 2000-01  used in figure I as part of an ongoing project to measure governance worldwide,
drawing on a wide variety of sources of data on perceptions of governance  and a consistent aggregation
methodology.  In addition to allowing us to construct a set of governance  indicators covering  a very  large
sample  of countries,  our  methodology  allows  the  construction  of measures  of the  precision  of these
governance  indicators. As we have found  in previous work, the standard errors  associated with estimates
of governance  are  large  relative  to  the  units  in which  governance  is  measured,  suggesting  that simple
country rankings can be misleading and underscoring the need for caution in making precise comparisons
of the quality of governance across countries using this type of data.
The next section turns to an interpretation  of the positive correlations  between  per capita  income
and governance  presented  in figure  1. This correlation  can,  in principle,  reflect some combination  of (a)
causal  effects  running  from  better  governance  to  higher  per  capita  income,  (b)  reverse  causation  or
feedback  from higher  per capita  income to  better governance,  and  (c)  omitted  variables  which  improve
both  governance and per capita income.  A recent body of literature  identifies large causal effects running
from  governance  to  per  capita  income,  using  deep  historical  determinants  of institutional  quality  as
3instruments.  Our contribution  is to provide evidence on the feedback  from incomes to governance,  which
is  important  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  First,  it  sheds  light  on  the  often-heard  argument  that  good
governance  is a  luxury that  only rich  countries  can  afford.  More practically,  because  aid  is increasingly
allocated  based  on  the  quality  of governance,  understanding  the  effects  of income  on  governance  is
important  for  determining  whether  poor  countries  should  receive  special  treatment  in  such  allocation
rules. Finally,  understanding  the extent of feedback  from per capita  income to governance  is  crucial for
interpreting the governance performance of countries  in Latin America  and the Caribbean documented  in
figure  1.
Despite  its importance,  this channel of reverse causation has  not been subject to much empirical
scrutiny,  at least  partly  because  the required  convincing  instruments  for  per  capita  income  in  a cross
section of countries  are  very  scarce.  Our  identification  strategy,  however,  relies  not  on success  in  the
search  for such elusive  instruments,  but on the use of nonsample  information.  In particular, we show that
the  information  on  the  precision  or  accuracy  of  our  governance  indicators  and  some  judicious
assumptions  regarding  the  extent  of measurement  error  in  per  capita  income  and  the  importance  of
omitted  variables  are  sufficient  to  identify  the  causal  effects  running  from  per  capita  income  to
governance.
Based on this empirical  strategy,  our rather surprising finding in this section  is a lack of evidence
on  a positive  effect  of incomes  on the quality  of governance.  Using  our estimates  of the  (substantial)
imprecision  of the  governance  indicators,  we  find  that  the  data  are  consistent  with  a strong  negative
feedback  from  per capita  income  to  governance.  The  assumptions  required  to  negate  such  results  are
unrealistic:  the only way that it would be possible  to identify positive feedback from per capita income  to
governance  is to  assume  that either measurement  error  in  governance  is  implausibly  large or important
omitted  variables  are  driving per capita  income  and  governance  in opposite  directions.  This  fnding  of
negative  feedback  from incomes to governance  implies that without other interventions, higher incomes
do not guarantee  improved governance.
The  empirical  framework  we  use  to  identify  the  causal  effects  running  from  governance  to
income and  vice  versa  is designed  to  capture  effects  in the  very  long  run.  As  a result,  our finding  of
negative  feedback cannot  be  interpreted as  implying that rapid  growth over  relatively short periods  such
as  a decade  should be associated  with declines  in governance.  Nor can  it be interpreted  as  implying that
other shocks that are associated  with temporarily higher growth  should be associated  with a deterioration
in governance.  Similarly,  factors that are good for growth  in the long run will not be negatively correlated
with institutional  quality,  since most such variables are likely to have substantial direct positive effects on
governance that outweigh  any negative  feedback effects through  income.  Finally, the finding of negative
feedback  from incomes  to governance  does not imply a negative  unconditional  correlation  between  these
4two  variables,  since  this  correlation  is  dominated  by the  strong  positive  effects  of governance  on  per
capita income.
What,  then,  should  we  make  of  this  finding  of  negative  feedback?  We  underscore  two
implications.  The  first  is  rather  obvious:  negative  feedback  implies  that  improvements  in  institutional
quality  or  governance  are  unlikely to  occur  merely  as  a consequence  of economic  development.  It  is
important  not to  exaggerate  the conventional  wisdom that  as  countries  become  richer,  higher  incomes
lead  to  demands  for  better  institutional  quality.  The  second  follows  from  the  first:  in the  absence  of
positive feedback,  we should not expect to see virtuous circles  from higher incomes  to better institutions,
which  in turn support higher incomes in the very  long run. This  is, perhaps,  not too surprising.  It is  not
hard to  think of a variety of reasons why  entrenched  elites  in  a country benefit  from the  status  quo  of
misgovernance  and  can  successfully  resist  demands  for  change  even  as  incomes  rise  over very  long
periods  of time.  In  the  last  section  of the  paper,  we  use  recent  evidence  gathered  through  detailed
governance  diagnostic surveys at the country level to cast light on a mechanism through which influential
elites can resist demands for improvement  in govemance-namely,  the phenomenon of state capture. We
then discuss the implications of this state capture  hypothesis for strategies to improve governance.
MEASURING  GOVERNANCE
This  section  summarizes  our  earlier  work,  in  which  we  organize  a large  set of indicators  of
perceptions  of govemance  into six  clusters  corresponding  to  six basic  dimensions  of governance.'  We
then  describe  the data sources  and  explain  our methodology  for combining  the many  indicators  within
each cluster into six aggregate governance  indicators.
Governance Clusters
We construct six aggregate governance  indicators,  motivated by a broad definition  of governance
as the traditions and institutions by which authority  is exercised in a country. This includes the process by
which  govemments  are selected,  monitored, and  replaced;  the capacity  of the goverrnent to effectively
formulate  and implement  sound  policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that
govern  economic  and  social  interactions  among  them.  This  classification  of  indicators  into  clusters
corresponding  to this definition of governance  is not intended to be definitive.  Rather,  it reflects our own
1.  Kaufmann, Kraay,  and Zoido-Lobat6n  (1999a,  1999b, 2002).
5views  of  what  constitutes  a  useful  and  interesting  organization  of the  data  that  is  consistent  with
prevailing notions of governance.
The  first  two  governance  clusters  are  intended  to  capture  the  first  part  of our  definition  of
governance:  the process  by which  those  in  authority  are  selected  and replaced.  We refer to the  first of
these  as  voice  and  accountability;  it  includes  a  number  of indicators  measuring  various  aspects  of the
political process, civil liberties,  and political rights. These  indicators measure  the extent to which citizens
of a  country  are  able  to  participate  in  the  selection  of governments.  This  category  also  encompasses
indicators measuring  the independence  of the media,  which serves  an  important role in monitoring those
in  authority  and  holding them  accountable  for  their  actions.  The  second governance  cluster  is  labeled
political  stability.  This index  combines several  indicators that measure  perceptions  of the  likelihood  that
the  government  in  power  will  be  destabilized  or  overthrown  by  possibly  unconstitutional  or  violent
means,  including  terrorism.  This  index captures  the  idea that the  quality of governance  in  a  country  is
compromised  by the  likelihood of wrenching changes  in government,  which not only  has a direct effect
on the continuity of policies, but also undermines the ability of all citizens to peacefully select and replace
those in power.
The next two clusters summarize  various  indicators of the government's  ability to formulate  and
implement  sound policies. In  government  effectiveness,  we  combine perceptions  of the quality of public
service  provision,  the quality  of the bureaucracy,  the competence  of civil servants,  the independence  of
the civil  service from political pressures,  and the credibility of the government's commitment  to policies.
The  main  focus  of this  index  is on  the  inputs  required  for  the  government  to be  able to  produce  and
implement  good policies and  deliver public goods. The second cluster, which  we call  regulatory  quality,
is more  focused  on the policies  themselves.  It includes  measures  of the  incidence  of market-unfriendly
policies  such  as  price  controls  or  inadequate  bank  supervision,  as  well  as  perceptions  of the  burdens
imposed by excessive regulation  in areas such as foreign trade and business development.
The  last  two  clusters  summarize  in  broad  terms  the  respect  of citizens  and  the  state  for the
institutions  that govern  their  interactions.  In  rule of law,  we include  several  indicators  that measure  the
extent to which agents have confidence  in and abide by the rules of society.  These  include  perceptions  of
the incidence  of both violent  and nonviolent  crime, the effectiveness  and predictability  of the judiciary,
and the enforceability  of contracts.  Together,  these  indicators  measure a society's  success  in developing
an  environment  in which  fair and predictable  rules form the  basis for economic  and  social  interactions.
The final cluster, control of corruption,  measures  perceptions of corruption, conventionally  defined as the
exercise  of public  power  for  private  gain.  Despite  this  straightforward  focus,  the  particular  aspect  of
corruption  measured  by  the various  sources  differs  somewhat,  ranging  from the frequency  of having to
make additional  payments to get things done, to the effects  of corruption on the business  environment,  to
6measuring grand  corruption  in the political arena  or in  the tendency  of elites  to engage  in  state  capture.
The presence of corruption  is often  a manifestation  of a lack of respect  on the part of both the corrupter
(typically a private citizen or firm) and the  corrupted (typically a public official)  for the rules that govern
their interactions.  It thus represents a failure of governance according to our definition.
Sources of Governance Data
This  section  describes  the  set  of governance  measures  used  to  construct  our  six  composite
governance  indicators  for 2000-01.  We  rely on  194  different measures  drawn from seventeen  different
sources of subjective  governance  data  constructed  by fifteen different  organizations,  as  listed in table 2.
These sources include  international  organizations,  political and business risk rating agencies,  think tanks,
and nongovernmental  organizations.2 Four of these sources are included  in the 2000-01  index for the first
time, and  the remaining  are  updates  of sources  included  in the  1997-98  indicators.3 In this section,  we
provide an overview  of some  of the key features  of these sources.  A previous  paper  presents a detailed
description of each of the sources.4
We  focus  on  a  set of indicators  that  measures  subjective  perceptions  regarding  the  quality  of
governance  across  countries.  We  do  not  attempt  to  compile  or  present  the  wide  array  of  available
quantitative  and descriptive  data on  cross-country  differences  in political and  social  institutions.5 While
these  are certainly  important determinants  of the cross-country  differences in the quality of governance,
our  focus  centers  on  measuring  the  reporting  of  various  stakeholders-residents  of  a  country,
entrepreneurs,  foreign  investors,  and  civil  society  at  large-regarding  the  quality  of governance  in  a
country.  This kind of data is inherently subjective,  but it is useful for at least two reasons.  First, for many
issues such as the prevalence  of corruption,  objective data are almost by definition extremely  difficult  to
2.  For  access  to  the  full data  set  of governance  indicators,  background  papers,  and  detailed  explanations  on its
sources, visit www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2001.htm.
3.  Two of the sources we consider  updates of existing  sources are, in  fact, new surveys that include questions similar
to those in their previous incarnations.  These are the World Bank's World Business Environment  Survey, which is  a
follow-up to the  1997  World Development  Report  Survey,  and the Gallup Millennium  Survey,  which we treat as a
follow-up to the Gallup 50th Anniversary Survey included  in our previous paper.  Sources  also overlap somewhat.  A
portion  of  the  World  Bank's  Business  and  Enterprise  Environment  Survey  (BPS,  see
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/beepsinteractive.htm)  was  used  in  the World  Business  Environment  Survey;
we refer to the former as a distinct source only when we use questions that appear only in that survey.  Also, in 1997
we used data  from the Global Competitiveness  Survey for Africa as a separate  source. In  2000, with the exception of
the questions on  state capture  for transition economies,  its questionnaire  coincided with that of the World Business
Environment  Survey,  so  we  include  it  in the  latter source.  Finally,  one source  we used  in 1997-98  is no  longer
published (Central European  Economic Review), such that we are unable to update this source.
4. Kaufmann,  Kraay, and Zoido-Lobat6n  (2002, appendix  1).
5. See  for  example  Beck  and  others  (2001)  for  a compilation  of objective  indicators  of political  systems  across
countries.
7obtain,  and  few  alternatives  to  subjective  indicators  are  available  for  measuring  these  aspects  of
governance.  Second,  perceptions  of the  quality  of governance  may  often be  as  important  as  objective
differences  in  institutions  across  countries.  While  a  country  may  nominally  enjoy  a  set  of sound
institutions  according  to  certain  standards,  the  country's  residents  must  have  confidence  in  these
institutions if they are to contribute to good governance.6
Table 2. Sources  of Governance Data, 2000-01
Country  New in
Source/Institution  Publication/Survey  Code  Type  coverage Representative 2000-01
Business Environment  Risk  Business Risk  Service  BRI  Poll  50
Intelligence
Columbia  University  State Capacity Project  CUD  Poll  109  x  x
Economist Intelligence Unit  Country Risk Service  EIU  Poll  115  x
European Bank for  Transition Report  EBR  Poll  26
Reconstruction  and  D
Development
Freedom House  Nations in  Transition  FHT  Poll  27
Freedom House  Freedom in the World  FRH  Poll  192  x
Gallup International  Gallup Millennium Survey  GMS  Survey  60
Heritage Foundation/Wall  Economic Freedom Index  HWJ  Poll  161  x
Street Journal
Institute for Management  and World Competitiveness  Yearbook  WCY  Survey  49
Development
Latinobar6metro  Latinobar6metro  Surveys  LBO  Survey  17  x
Political Economic Risk  Asia Intelligence  PRC  Survey  14
Consultancy
Political Risk Services  International  Country Risk Guide  PRS  Poll  140  x
PriceWaterhouseCoopers  Opacity Index  PWC  Survey  35  x
Standard and Poor's DRI  Country Risk Review  DRI  Poll  111  x
McGraw-Hill
World Bank  Business Enterprise  Environment  BPS  Survey  18  x
Survey
World Bank  World Business Environment  WBS  Survey  81  x
Survey
World Economic  Forum  Global Competitiveness  Report  GCS  Survey  75
We  distinguish  sources  according  to  (I)  whether  they  are  polls  of  experts  or  surveys  of
businesspeople or citizens  in general  and (2) the extent to which the sample of countries  included  in the
6. In this  context,  it is noteworthy  that  nowadays  almost every  country in the  world  has adequate  anticorruption
legislation,  yet the actual variation in corruption control  across countries  is  enormous.  The conceptual soundness of
many  of the  supposedly  objective  governance  measures  being  advanced  is  another  weakness.  It  is unclear,  for
instance,  whether  a high  number of jailed  criminals  per capita  indicates  a high  or low  level  of rule of law (Russia
and the  United  States  are tied for first place  in this  indicator).  This  contrasts  with subjective  indicators  emerging
from  polls  of experts  and  surveys,  in  which  the  questions  are  a priori  designed  to  capture  the  normative  range
between a bad and a good outcome.
8sources  is  representative  of the world as a whole.7 These  two types  of sources  of governance  data have
their advantages  and  disadvantages.  The  main  advantage  of polls of experts  is  that they  are  explicitly
designed for cross-country  comparability,  and  considerable  effort is placed  in the benchmarking  process
that ensures  this. The difficulties with such measures are also clear, however.  They are typically  based on
the opinions of only  a few experts  per country,  and the quality of the country  ratings depends to  a great
extent on the knowledge  of experts regarding the countries they are assessing.  The ratings are  particularly
prone to two types of feedback:  countries  with good  economic  outcomes may  be  more  likely to receive
favorable  ratings, and country rankings  by other organizations are frequently  included as an  input into the
rating process  of each  organization.  Country ratings may also be affected  by the political  or ideological
agenda of the organization  producing the  ratings.  Despite these difficulties,  there are at least two  reasons
to think that, on average,  such sources provide  valuable information  on governance.  First, the indicators
produced by such organizations  generally correlate  strongly with measures  based on surveys of residents
and entrepreneurs.  Second, the fact that commercial  rating organizations  are  consistently able to sell their
assessments  to  commercial  subscribers  for  considerable  fees  suggests  that these  sources  are  producing
useful information.
The main advantage of surveys  is that they reflect the opinions of a larger number of respondents
who are more closely connected with the countries they are assessing. Nevertheless,  they suffer from two
disadvantages.  First,  survey  questions  can  be  interpreted  in  context-  or  culture-specific  ways.  For
example,  a  response  regarding  the  prevalence  of "improper  practices"  is  colored  by  country-specific
perceptions  of what  is  improper.  This  will  hinder  the  cross-country  comparability  of  responses  to
otherwise  identical  questions.  Second,  cross-country  surveys  relating  to  governance  are  very  costly  to
design  and implement,  and  as a result they typically cover  a much  smaller set of countries than  polls of
experts.
Sources  of governance  data  also  vary  with  respect  to  the  sample  of countries  they  cover.  A
number of sources  cover a very  large sample of developed  and developing countries,  while in others the
sample of countries is very narrowly focused.  Furthermore,  many of the  poorest and smallest countries  in
the  world  are  not  covered  by  commercially  oriented  polls  because  they  are  relatively  unattractive  to
foreign investors. Since there is a strong positive association  across countries  between governance and per
capita income,  this difference  between sources  makes it difficult to compare  indicators from  sources  that
7. In the  1997-98  version  of the  governance  database,  our  sources  consisted  of eight  polls  of experts  and  seven
surveys,  and five of our sources were  classified  as representative.  In the 2000-01  version,  we  have added two new
surveys-namely,  the  World  Bank's  Business  Environment  and  Enterprise  Performance  Survey  of  firms  in
transition  economies  (BEEPS)  and  Latinobar6metro  (LBO),  a  private  survey  conducted  in seventeen  Latin
American  countries-and  two  new  polls  of  experts-the  Columbia  University  State  Capacity  Study  (CUD),
covering  109 countries worldwide,  and the PriceWaterhouseCoopers  Opacity Index,  covering thirty-five countries.
9cover  sets of countries  with very  different  income  levels.  Similarly,  regional  differences  in  governance
may hamper comparisons across sources. For example,  it is not clear how to compare a governance  rating
based only on transition economies  with one based on a broad set of countries.  As discussed  in a previous
paper,  the  methodology  we  use  to construct  aggregate  govemance  indicators  takes  these differences  in
country coverage  into account, as the data from  individual sources are transformed  into common units for
aggregation across  sources.8 This results in a set of aggregate governance  indicators covering  a very large
cross section of countries,  ranging from  159 to  173 depending on the measure of governance.
Aggregation  Methodology
Implicit  in our organization of the data is the view that within each cluster, the  indicators measure
a similar underlying  basic concept  of governance.  Combining  these  related  indicators  into an  aggregate
governance  indicator for each  cluster offers considerable  benefits. First, the aggregate  indicators  span  a
much larger  set of countries than any individual  source,  permitting comparisons  of governance  across a
broader set of countries than would be possible using any single  source.  Second, aggregate  indicators can
provide more precise measures  of governance than individual  indicators.  Third,  it is possible to construct
quantitative  measures  of the precision  of both the  aggregate  governance  estimates  for each  country and
their  components.  This  allows  formal  testing  of  hypotheses  regarding  cross-country  differences  in
governance. We also use the  information on the precision of the governance  indicators to help identify the
effects of income on governance.
For each cluster,  we  combine the component  indicators  into  an  aggregate  governance  indicator
using the same methodology  with which we calculated our first set of indicators.9 We use an extension  of
the standard unobserved components  model, which expresses the observed  data in each cluster as a linear
function  of  the  unobserved  common  component  of  governance,  plus  a  disturbance  term  capturing
perception errors  and  sampling variation  in  each  indicator.1 0 In particular,  we  assume that we  can write
the observed score of countryj on indicator k, yj,  k), as a linear function  of unobserved  governance, g(f),
and a disturbance term, E(j, k), as follows:
(1)  {j,k)=a(k)+  (k} [g()+ E(j,k)k
where a(k) and  0(k) are  unknown  parameters  that map  unobserved  governance,  g(j),  into  the  observed
data, y(j,  k). As a  choice of units, we  assume  that g(Q)  is a  random  variable  with mean zero  and variance
8.  Kaufmann,  Kraay, and Zoido-Lobat6n (1999a).
9. This methodology  is  documented  in  detail  in Kaufinann,  Kraay, and Zoido-Lobat6n (1999a).
10.  Unobserved  components  models  were  pioneered  in economics  by  Goldberger  (1972);  the  closely  related
hierarchical  and empirical  Bayes models in statistics were developed by Efron and Morris (1971,  1972).
10one. We further assume that the error term has zero mean and a variance that is the same across countries,
but differs across indicators, that is,  E[(  j,k)2]= c.(k).
The disturbance  term, &(/, k),  captures two sources  of uncertainty in the relationship  between true
governance and the  observed  indicators.  First, the particular aspect of governance  covered  by indicator k
is imperfectly  measured  in each country,  reflecting either  perception  errors on the part of experts  (in the
case  of polls  of experts)  or  sampling  variation  (in  the  case  of surveys  of citizens  or  entrepreneurs).
Second,  the relationship between  the particular  concept  measured by  indicator  k and the corresponding
broader  aspect  of governance  may  be  imperfect.  For example,  even  if the  particular  aspect  of graft
covered by some indicator k (such as the prevalence of improper practices)  is perfectly measured,  it may
be  a noisy indicator of graft if countries exhibit differences  in the  perceived nature of improper practices.
Both  of these  sources  of uncertainty  are  reflected  in  the  indicator-specific  variance  of the  error term,
a 2(k).
Given  estimates  of the  model's parameters,  a(k),  3(k),  and a(k), we  can  compute  estimates  of
governance  for  each  country,  as  well  as  measures  of the  precision  of these  estimates.  Formally,  the
estimate of governance  for a  country produced  by the unobserved  components model  is the mean  of the
distribution of unobserved governance  conditional  on the K(j)  observed data points for that country.  This
conditional  mean  is  the  following  weighted  average  of appropriately  rescaled  scores  of each  of the
component indicators:
y (i,k  -_a  (k)
(2)  E>(J)  y(ij4)...y[ijK(i)}  w(k)  ()
where  the  weights  applied  to  each  source  k,  w(k)=  )2  are  inversely  proportional  to  the
K()  2
h=t
variance  of the  error  term  of that  source.  We  also  report  the  standard  deviation  of this  conditional
distribution as an  indicator of the confidence  we can have in this estimate, which is
(3)  SD tQ) l(ij,1)...,y[i,K(j)]= '1+ ta(k)j
This standard  deviation  is  declining  in the number of individual  indicators  in which  a particular country
appears, and it is increasing in the variance of the disturbance term on each of these  indicators.
The assumptions of the unobserved components model ensure that the distribution of governance
in each country  is normal, conditional  on the data for that country. Therefore,  these conditional  means and
standard  deviations  for each  country have  a natural  interpretation.  For example, a useful interpretation of
11the  reported  estimates  and  standard  deviations  for  each  country  is  to  note  that  there  is  a 90  percent
probability  that the "true" level of governance  in a country  is in an  interval  of plus or minus  1.64 times
the  reported  standard  deviation  centered  on the point  estimate  itself.  We  refer  to such a range  as  a 90
percent confidence interval around the estimate of governance for a country."H
Implementing  this  approach  requires  estimates  of all  the unknown  survey-specific  parameters,
a(k), 0(k), and  cy  (k). We do this in a two-stage procedure.  First, we assume that governance  and the error
terms  in equation  I are jointly  normally  distributed,  and  we apply maximum  likelihood methods  using
only the representative  sources to retrieve  the parameters  of interest  for each governance  cluster.  This is
nothing more  than a standard  application  of the  unobserved  components  model.  We  cannot,  however,
include  our many  nonrepresentative  sources  in the  first stage of the  estimation  procedure,  because  the
distribution of unobserved  governance  in the  subset of countries covered  by these surveys  is unlikely to
be the same as that for the world as a whole, causing the maximum  likelihood procedure  to break  down.
Instead,  in  the  second  stage  we  use  the  initial  governance  estimates  obtained  from  the  representative
sources  as  an  observable  proxy  for  governance.  We  obtain  the  parameters  of  interest  for  the
nonrepresentative  sources  by regressing  these  indicators  on  observable  governance,  that  is, by  directly
estimating equation  1.12 We then use all the estimated parameters of the unobserved  components model to
construct a final set of governance estimates.
Our choice of units for governance  ensures that the estimates of governance have  a mean  of zero
and a standard  deviation of one.'3 Since we adopt the same choice of units for governance  in each period,
the  indicators  are  not  informative  about  a  worldwide  average  trend  in  governance,  although  they  are
informative  about  how  countries'  relative  positions  change  over  time.  The  aggregate  indicators  are
oriented such that higher values correspond  to better governance outcomes. Appendix 2 reports the point
estimates of governance,  the estimated standard errors,  and the number of sources by country for each of
six governance  indicators  in  2000-01.  For reference,  the  corresponding  information  for  the  1997-98
indicators is reported, as well, in the same table.
As emphasized  in our previous work, we find that the six dimensions of governance  are not very
precisely  measured,  in the sense that the measured  standard  deviations  are  large  relative  to the units  in
11.  This is a slight abuse of terminology,  since these are not confidence  intervals  in the usual  frequentist  sense of a
stochastically  varying interval centered around a fixed unknown parameter.  Rather,  we treat governance  as a random
variable,  and  the  90 percent  confidence  interval  is simply  the fifth  and ninety-fifth  percentiles  of the conditional
distribution of governance given the observed data.
12. To get consistent  estimates of the parameters of the nonrepresentative  sources,  we need to adjust for attenuation
bias caused  by the fact that our observable  proxy for governance  is a noisy indicator of true governance.  Fortunately,
we  can  use the  information  on  the standard  errors  associated  with  the  governance  estimates  obtained  in the  first
stage to do this.
12which  governance  is  measured.  Figure  2  illustrates  this  point  using  the rule  of law  indicator.  We  list
countries  in  ascending order according to their point estimates of govemance  on the horizontal  axis, and
on the  vertical  axis  we plot  the governance  estimate  and  the associated  90  percent  confidence  interval
described above. The size of the confidence  intervals varies across countries,  as different countries appear
in  different  numbers  of sources  with  different  variances.  The  resulting  confidence  intervals  are  large
relative  to the  units  in which  governance  is measured.  To  emphasize  this point, the  horizontal  lines  in
figure 2  delineate the quartiles of the distribution of governance  estimates.  While the differences  between
countries  in  the  bottom  and  top  quartiles  are  significant,  relatively  few  countries  have  90  percent
confidence  intervals that lie entirely within a given quartile.
It  is  clear  from  the  figure  that  many  of the  small  differences  in  governance  estimates  across
countries are not likely to be statistically  significant.  For many applications,  therefore,  it is more useful to
focus on  the  range  of possible  governance  values  for  each  country  (as  summarized  in  the  90  percent
confidence  intervals  shown in figure 2) rather than merely  observing  the point estimates.  The differences
in governance  are  clearly  significant between  two countries  that lie at opposite  ends of the  governance
scale and whose  90  percent confidence  intervals  do not overlap.  One  should be  much  more circumspect
about  the  significance  of estimated  differences  in  governance  between  two  countries  that  lie  closer
together  and whose  90 percent  confidence  intervals  overlap  (which can  also  be  seen  in  figure  2).  The
same  is true  for changes over  time in the governance  indicator.  To illustrate  this, figure 2  also plots the
1997-98 estimate for each country (as a solid  dot). For most countries,  the 90 percent confidence  interval
around the 2000-01  score also  encompasses the governance  estimate for  1997-98.  This emphasizes  that
many (though not all) of the changes  over time in our governance  indicators over this very short term are
unlikely to be statistically significant at conventional  levels.1 4
In  a recent paper, we provide a more detailed  analysis of the  sources of the changes  over time  in
our governance  indicators."  Mechanically,  changes  over  time  in the  governance  indicators  are due  to a
combination of three factors:  changes  in governance perceptions  as reported by the individual  underlying
sources;  changes  in  the  weights  that  the  aggregation  procedure  assigns  to  the  individual  underlying
sources;  and  changes  in  the  set  of  underlying  sources  used  to  construct  the  aggregate  governance
indicators.  For four of our six indicators,  we find that changes  in the country ratings of underlying sources
account  for  more  than  three-quarters  of the  variance  in  changes  over  time  in  observed  governance.
However, for the rule of law and control of corruption indicators, we find that roughly half of the variance
13.  Since  the estimates of governance  are  normally  distributed,  this  implies  that  the  vast majority of observations
will fall between -2.5  and 2.5.
14. Kaufmann,  Kraay, and Zoido-Lobat6n  (2002)  discusses in more  detail the interpretation  of changes  over time in
the governance estimates.
15. Kaufmnann,  Kraay, and Zoido-Lobat6n  (2002).
13of changes  over time stems  from  changes  in  weights assigned  by  the aggregation  procedure,  as  well  as
from  changes over time  in the available sources  for individual  countries.  This  points to a further reason
for caution in interpreting changes over time in these governance  indicators.
CAUSATION  FROM GOVERNANCE  TO INCOME AND FROM INCOME TO GOVERNANCE
In  this  section,  we  present  an  empirical  framework  that  allows  us  to  identify  causal  effects
running  in  both  directions  between  governance  and  per  capita  income.  A  rapidly  growing  literature
identifies  the causation  from better governance  to higher  per capita  income.  Our contribution  here  is to
propose  a  strategy of using  nonsample  information  to identify  causation  in  the opposite direction,  from
per  capita  income  to  governance.  When  we  implement  this  strategy,  we  find  no  evidence  of positive
feedback  from  higher  per  capita  income  to  better  governance  outcomes,  unless  we  make  rather
implausible assumptions on this nonsample information.
Identifying Causal Effects
Several  papers  identify  the  causal  effects  running  from  better  governance  to higher  per  capita
income  in  the  very  long  run,  using  instrumental  variables  (IV)  regressions  on  a  cross  section  of
countries.16 Underlying all these papers is the following empirical  model:
(4)  y, = ac  +  P  g,  + ej,
(5)  g,=  i+y y,+ 6 x,+u,,
(6)  y; = y, + w,  and
(7)  g; = g., + u, .
Equation 4 says that log per capita income, y, depends on govemance, g, and other factors outside
this very parsimonious  specification,  e. Under the assumptions that initial  incomes  in the distant past are
not too different across countries and that governance  does not change too much over time (so that current
observed  levels  of governance  are  a  reasonable  proxy  for  their  "initial"  values),  equation  4  can  be
interpreted as capturing the effects  of governance  on growth  in the very long run.
Equation  5 says  that governance depends on incomes,  some other observed variable,  x, and other
factors outside the model, v. The dependence of governance on  incomes could be interpreted as reflecting
a  demand  for  better formal  institutions  in richer  and more  complex environments.  Institutional  quality
16.  Hall  and  Jones  (1999);  Kaufmann,  Kraay,  and  Zoido-Lobat6n  (1999b);  Acemoglu,  Johnson,  and  Robinson
(2001);  Easterly and Levine (2002).
14also depends  on  a variety of other  factors  included  in  x;  as discussed  below,  cross-country  variation in
such  variables  allows  identification  of the  effects  of  governance  on  incomes  in  equation  4.  Finally,
equations  6  and  7  simply  state  that  observed  income,  y*,  and  observed  governance,  g*,  are  noisy
measures of actual income and governance, with measurement error w and u, respectively.
To  complete the description of the model, we assume  that the disturbances  have zero mean and
variances  o2, i = e, v, u, w.  We  also assume that measurement error is classical  in the sense that w and u
are  uncorrelated  with e, v, and x. We also assume that the omitted variables in equation 5 are uncorrelated
with x,  but they may be  correlated  with the omitted variables  in equation 4, that  is, E[e.v]=p.ae.av. This
captures  the  possibility  that  there  may  be other  variables  outside  the  simple  model  that  affect  both
governance  and per capita income.  Finally,  we assume  that the  error term  in  equation  4 is uncorrelated
with x, which allows us to use x as an instrument to estimate equation 4.
Existing  papers  focus  primarily  on  finding  the  magnitude  of the effect  of governance  on  per
capita  income, that is, ,B.  This  can be done by estimating equation  4 by instrumental variables,  using x as
an  instrument.  The  search  for  good  instruments  has  led  many  researchers  in  the  direction  of deep
historical  determinants  of  institutions.  For  example,  Acemoglu,  Johnson,  and  Robinson  use  settler
mortality in the eighteenth  and nineteenth centuries  as instruments,  arguing that colonial powers had weak
incentives  to  establish  the  institutions  of good  governance  in colonies  where  a  permanent  European
presence was unlikely to take root.1 7 This is essentially a nuanced  interpretation of the simple instruments
for  colonial  origin  proposed  by  Hall  and  Jones."  Another  strand  of the  literature  emphasizes  the
importance  of natural  resource  endowments  in  determining  the  development  of good  institutions,  and
Easterly and Levine provide a recent cross-country  empirical implementation  of this view.' 9
In view of the popularity  of such historically motivated  instruments,  we often use the shorthand
of referring to x as "history."  These papers  go to considerable  lengths to justify the assumption that x is a
valid  instrument  in the sense  that it is strongly correlated with  governance  and is uncorrelated  with the
error term in equation 4. We do not repeat their arguments  here, but simply proceed  under the assumption
that this is a reasonable instrumentation  strategy.  We refer the reader to these other papers for detai'-.
Our contribution  in this section is to focus on equation 5, which tells us about the feedback  from
higher  incomes  to  better  governance,  y. This  is  obviously  relevant  for  policy.  For  example,  when
allocating aid,  should multilaterals  give  poor countries a misgovernance  discount,  based,  in part, on the
quality of their  institutions?  Does  development  itself bring about  improvements  in  governance  without
direct interventions to help build institutions?  More crudely,  is good governance  a luxury that only richer
17. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
18. Hall and Jones (1999).
15countries  can  afford?  Finally,  identifying  y  is  useful  because  it  allows  us  to  understand  the  relative
importance of history versus income  in determining observed  levels of governance today.
In  principle,  one  can  estimate  equation  5 given  a  suitable  instrument,  that  is,  a  variable  that
belongs  in equation  4 but not in equation 5. This is hard to do in practice,  however, since  it is difficult to
identify  very  convincing  instruments  for  income,  that is,  variables  that  are correlated  with  income  but
have  no effects  on  governance  other  than  through  their  effects  on  income.  Many  of the  likely  deep
determinants of long-run cross-country income differences,  such as favorable geographical  location, good
natural  resource  endowments,  temperate  climates,  or colonial  history,  plausibly  exert a direct effect  on
institutional  quality as well, disqualifying such variables as instruments in this application.
Instead  of searching for instruments  for income,  we  adopt the other  (but  less commonly  used)
textbook solution to the problem of identification:  namely, the use of nonsample  information. To identify
the effects of income  on governance,  that is, y in equation  5, we need to come  up with  three pieces  of
nonsample  information-the  variance  of measurement  error in  incomes  and  governance  (a2  and  52),
and the correlation  between the error terms in equations 4 and 5, p. As we discuss below, our assumptions
about measurement  error  in per capita  income will  not matter much for the results.  This means that we
only  need  to  come  up  with  two  additional  pieces  of  information  in  order  to  identify  the  model  in
equations  4  through  7.  Our  strategy  is  to  use our  estimates  of the standard  errors  associated  with  the
governance  indicators to pin down the measurement error in governance,  and then to consider a range of
plausible values for the correlation between the error terms in the two structural equations. With these two
nonsample  pieces  of information  in hand, we have a system  of equations  linking the parameters  of the
model with the observed  sample  moments in the data, which we can solve for the remaining parameters  of
interest.20 We provide details of the identification  procedure in Appendix  1.
To develop some  intuitions  for the role of our assumptions  about these two  key parameters,  we
note that all the papers  mentioned above find that the instrumented  estimates of the effects of governance
on  per capita  income  in  equation 4 are  larger  than the  OLS  estimates of the same  equation.  With  some
manipulation of equations 4 through 7, one can show that this implies that
(8)  y +p- I 'l  <  -(  -Y  O) (S (8  e
19. Engerman and Sokoloff(1997,  in this volume), Easterly and Levine (2002).
20. Both Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu,  Johnson,  and Robinson (2001)  use the difference  between their OLS
and IV estimates to make inferences  about the importance of measurement error in govemance.  Since we have direct
estimates of this measurement  error,  we  can go  one step  further and  use this information  to estimate  the  feedback
from per capita income to governance.
16Suppose that there  is no measurement  error in governance,  that is,  c,. = 0, so that the  right-hand
side  of  equations  8  is  zero.  Then  the  only  way  there  can  be  positive  feedback  from  incomes  to
governance,  that  is,  y  > 0,  is  if there  are  omitted variables  in  equations  4  and 5 that move  income  and
governance  in opposite directions,  that is, p < 0.
In  the  absence  of such  variables,  the  only  other  way  that there  can  be  positive  feedback  from
incomes to governance  is if there  is substantial measurement  error in governance, a,, > 0. In this case, the
IV  estimates are larger than  the OLS estimates  simply because  they are eliminating the usual attenuation
bias  caused  by  measurement  error  in  the  dependent  variable.2'  The  key  question  is  whether  there  is
enough  measurement  error in the  data  to allow for the  possibility  of positive  feedback  from  per capita
income to governance, that is, y > 0. We investigate this question in the remainder of this section.
Results
To implement  this exercise,  we begin by estimating  equation  4.  We measure  per capita  income
using  real per capita gross domestic  product  (GDP)  from the Summers and Heston  Penn World  Tables,
version  5.6,  which  we  extend  into the  1990s using  constant  local currency  growth  rates.  We  measure
governance  using the rule  of law  index discussed  in  the  previous  section.  We  focus  on this  particular
dimension  of governance  for two  reasons.  First,  it corresponds most closely to the concept  of protection
of property  rights that  has been widely used  in this  literature.  Second,  as discussed  in the introduction,
this  is  one of the dimensions  of governance  for which  simple OLS  regressions suggest that countries  in
Latin  America appear to do relatively  poorly given their per  capita incomes. Since rule of law is highly
correlated  with  both  corruption  and  government  effectiveness,  we  can  view  this  one  dimension  of
governance  as  representative  of the broader areas  in which the  quality of governance  appears relatively
poor in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Our  preferred  instrument  for  governance  is  the  settler  mortality  measure  introduced  by
Acemoglu,  Johnson,  and Robinson. 22 While  it is only available  for sixty-eight countries,  empirically  it is
strongly correlated  with  both  tropical  location (as measured  by  distance  from the equator)  and colonial
origins (as measured by the fractions  of the population  speaking English or a major European  language).
To expand the size of the sample,  we use these  last three  variables to  impute the missing values of settler
mortality  for  all  of the  countries  for which  we  have data  on  per  capita  income  and  governance.  This
results in a sample of 153  countries for which we have data on y, g, and x. We do, however, obtain similar
21. Throughout,  we assume that the stability condition, y*  -3 < 1,  holds.
22. Acemoglu,  Johnson,  and Robinson  (2001).
17results if we restrict  attention to the smaller  sample of sixty-eight countries  for which the original settler
mortality instrument  is available, or if we use the linguistic origins variables directly as instruments, as do
Hall and Jones.23
Table 3 reports  the  OLS  and IV  estimates  of equation  4, together with  the corresponding  first-
stage regression of governance on the instrument.  Consistent with the existing  literature discussed  above,
we find a strong causal effect running from governance to per capita income. The estimated coefficient  of
1.37  implies  that  a  one-standard-deviation  improvement  in  the  governance  measure  raises  per  capita
income  nearly fourfold  in the very long run. We also find the same phenomenon  in the literature,  in which
the  instrumented  estimate  of the coefficient  on  per  capita  income  is  substantially  larger  than the  OLS
estimate of 0.999.24
Table 3. Regression  Results  on Determinants of Income per Capitaa
Regressors  OLS  IV  First-stage
Intercept  7.867  7.845  2.445
(0.051)  (0.058)  (0.284)
Governance (Rule of Law)  0.999  1.370
(0.055)  (0.095)
Imputed  settler mortality  -0.547
(0.064)
Standard deviation (residuals)  0.630  0.820  0.741
Summary statistic
No. of observations  153  153  153
R'  0.69  0.69  0.37
a. This table  summarizes  the results of estimating  Equation 4 by  OLS and IV  (columns  I and 2)  and  the corresponding
first-stage  regression (column 3)  The dependent variable in  the OLS and IV  estimations is  In(per capita GDP); in  the first-
stage regression  it is governance.  Standard errors are in parentheses
Although  this  paper  focuses  on the  rule of law  indicator,  the  pattern of substantially  larger  IV
estimates relative  to their OLS counterparts  consistently  holds across all six governance  indicators. Table
4 reports the OLS and IV estimates of the slope coefficient  in equation 4, using the five other measures of
governance  and  the  same  settler  mortality  variable  as  an  instrument.  Since  we  do  not  have  distinct
instruments for each of the six dimensions  of governance,  we cannot interpret the results in tables 3 and 4
as  capturing  the partial  effects of each of these variables.  However, to the  extent that each  of these  is  a
proxy for some  broad  notion of governance,  these  estimates  can be  interpreted  as providing  a  range  of
23. Hall and Jones (1999).
24.  Interestingly,  the bivariate  scatterplot  of rule of law against  log per capita income  visually suggests  a nonlinear
effect of governance  on per capita income,  with a weaker effect (that is, a lower slope) in poor countries  than in  rich
countries.  While  this is qualitatively true,  we did not  find this nonlinearity  to be statistically significant.  Moreover,
given  our  pattern  of IV estimates  that are  larger  than OLS  estimates,  and  given  the  weaker  performance  of the
instrument in the first-stage regression  for the poorest half of the sample, we also cannot  discount the possibility  that
the difference in slopes in the two samples is simply  driven by the problem of weak instruments  (which  would bias
the IV  estimates toward  the OLS estimates  in the poor country sample).
18estimates  of the effect of governance  broadly  construed on  per capita income  in the very  long  run. We
return to this point in more detail below.
Table 4. Regression  Results Using Other Dimensions  of Governancea
Regressors  OLS  IV  No. observations
Voice and accountability  0.806  1.495  158
(0.074)  (0.151)
Political  stability  0.951  1.546  146
(0.068)  (0.156)
Government effectiveness  0.978  1.389  144
(0.058)  (0.121)
Regulatory quality  0.966  2.242  152
(0.084)  (0.301)
Control of corruption  0.920  1.412  145
(0.063)  (0.139)
a.  This  table summarizes  the results of estimating  equation  4  by  OLS and IV  for five other dimensions of governance.
For reasons of space,  only the estimated  slope coefficients  and the number of observations are reported.  The dependent
variable is  ln(per capita GDP). Standard errors are in  parentheses.
Figure 3 plots the estimated effects of governance on per capita income (in the top panel) and the
first-stage  regression  (in  the  bottom  panel),  with  countries  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean
highlighted and labeled.  When considering this causal channel from governance to per capita income, the
striking feature among the Latin American and Caribbean  countries is that the majority of them lie above
the instrumented regression  line. In fact, we find only six out of twenty-six countries below the regression
line  (namely,  Chile,  Uruguay,  Belize,  Costa  Rica,  Guyana,  and  the  Dominican  Republic).  One
interpretation  of this  is that  most countries  in Latin America  and the Caribbean  have  been  surprisingly
successful  in  raising  living  standards  without  the  benefit  of  good  governance.  A  less  optimistic
interpretation  is that the (relatively)  high income levels observed  in many countries in Latin America and
the Caribbean are inherently fragile because they are unsupported by sound institutions.25
The bottom panel of figure 3 illustrates where  countries in Latin America and the Caribbean  fall
in the first-stage  regression  of govemance  on  history.  Countries  in  the region are clustered  surprisingly
tightly  around  the  middle  of the  distribution  of (in  some  cases  imputed)  settler  mortality.  Only  four
countries stand out as having  particularly inhospitable  climates  for settlers-Jamaica,  Haiti,  Panama,  and
Nicaragua.  Moreover,  countries  in Latin America and the Caribbean  are scattered  quite evenly above and
below  the  first-stage  regression  line,  suggesting  that the effect  of history  on  current  institutions  is not
25.  This interpretation  is consistent with both anecdotal  and more systematic  evidence  that countries  that are  hit by
large  adverse  shocks  suffer  disproportionately  more  if the  quality  of their  institutions  is poor.  See,  for example,
Boone and others (2000), who argue  that declines in asset prices during the Asian crisis were larger in countries with
weak corporate governance.  More systematically,  Rodrik (1999)  shows that countries  lacking  institutions to manage
social conflict suffered  deeper declines in  output in response to the oil shocks of the  1970s.
19significantly  different  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  relative  to  the  rest  of the  world.  Taken
together,  these two  observations  suggest that "bad  history"  alone cannot  account for the  relatively  low
rule of law ratings for countries in Latin America  and the Caribbean that we noted in the introduction.26
We now turn to our estimates of equation 5, which captures the reverse causation from  income to
governance,  as well as the effects of history on governance.  Our estimates of the parameters of equation 5
depend  on  our  assumptions  about  the  three  additional  pieces  of nonsample  information  required  to
identify  this  equation.  Our  results  are  not  at  all  sensitive  to  our  assumptions  about  the  variance  of
measurement error in per capita income. We therefore just assume that  cow = 0.2, which  implies that a 95
percent  confidence  interval  for  per capita income  of a  country  runs  from  50  percent  to  150  percent  of
observed  income. Given the difficulties  in measuring GDP and purchasing power parity adjustments,  this
does not seem to be an implausible estimate of the extent of measurement error  in this variable.
In  contrast,  our  estimates  of the effects  of income  on  governance  depend  a  great deal  on  our
assumptions  about measurement error  in  governance,  a,,,  and the correlation  between  the error terms  in
equations  4  and  5,  p.  Table  5 presents the range  of estimates  of the  parameters  of equation  5 that  we
obtain, for a range of values for c,, and p. In the top panel, we set p = 0 and consider a range of values of
measurement error in  governance.  In  the bottom panel,  we fix the measurement error  in governance  and
consider a range of values  for p.
Table 5. Identifying the Effects of Income  on Governance
Value assigned  to au
Estimated  0.27  0.30  0.35  0.40  0.45  0.50  0.54
Parameters
p=O
y  -1.28  -1.15  -0.90  -0.62  -0.29  0.07  0.39
5  -1.51  -1.41  -1.22  -1.01  -0.77  -0.49  -0.25
cIV  1.68  1.56  1.35  1.10  0.81  0.49  0.21
Value assigned  to p
-0.20  -0.10  0.00  0.10  0.20
0.27
y  -0.48  -0.78  -1.28  -2.27  -5.32
8  -0.90  -1.14  -1.51  -2.25  -4.54
aYv  1.03  1.27  1.68  2.51  5.14
a. This  table  reports  estimates of the  effect of per  capita  incomes  and  history  on  governance  (y  and  8, respectively),  and  the
variance  of the  error term  in equation  5 (aJ),  for the  indicated  assumptions  on  measurement  error in governance  (aur)  and  the
correlation  between the errors in  equations 4 and 5  (p).
26.  For the region as a whole, this  low explanatory  power of history  as a determinant of misgovernance  is plausible,
given that these countries  attained  independence  almost two centuries ago and on the whole  the colonizers did  not
exert  the same destructive  institutional  influence as in other settings (such as certain parts of Africa). The contrasting
cases  of Argentina  and  Chile  offer  a  poignant  illustration  of the  limits  of history in explaining  the  quality  of
governance  today:  these  neighboring  countries  share  historical,  cultural,  location,  climatic,  and  linguistic
commonalities, but they have take widely divergent paths  in  terms of institutional quality.
20We use the information  in the standard errors of the rule of law  index described  in the previous
section to anchor the range of estimates for measurement error in governance.  In particular,  we begin with
a value  of au = 0.27,  which  is the  average  across  countries  of the  standard  errors  obtained  from  the
unobserved  components  model  used to  construct the aggregate  governance  indicator.  This  captures  the
extent to which the governance  measure  is a noisy  indicator of the true  rule of law within a country.  As
we discussed  in the previous section, these estimated  standard errors are already large relative  to the units
in which rule of law is measured.
We then consider  several higher values  up to a maximum  of a,  = 0.54,  or twice  the initial  level.
One way to rationalize  substantially higher measurement error such as this is to note that good rule of law
is just one of many dimensions  of good  governance  or institutional quality. Thus the extent to which rule
of law  is  itself an  imperfect  indicator of broader  notions of good  governance  that matter for economic
growth  in the  very long run can  also  be thought of as measurement  error.  A  rough way to calibrate  the
importance  of this type of measurement  error is to consider the  simple correlations,  r, of the rule of law
indicator with  the other  five  dimensions  of governance  discussed  in the previous  section, which  range
from  r = 0.76  (voice  and  accountability)  to  r = 0.93  (government  effectiveness),  and  average  r = 0.85
across all governance  components. Under the assumption that each of these  indicators  is a noisy measure
of the broadest  possible concept of good governance,  a straightforward  calculation  shows that ca,,  ranges
from 0.27 to 0.48 under this interpretation.27
For  the  benchmark  level  of measurement  error  of c,, = 0.27  (based  on  the  actual  rule  of law
standard  errors  discussed  above),  we  find  that  income  has  a  surprisingly  large  negative  effect  on
governance,  with a coefficient  of -1.28.  This implies that an exogenous  doubling of per capita income  in
the  very  long  run  leads  to  an  estimated  decline  in  governance  of -1.28 x 0.7 = -0.90,  or  nearly  one
standard  deviation  of the  governance  index.  Moving  across  the  columns  in  table  5  shows  that  the
estimated  feedback  from  per  capita  income  to governance  is  positive only  if the measurement  error  in
governance  is  very  high,  for  values  of  c,, > 0.50.  In  addition,  as  measurement  error  in  governance
becomes  larger, the effects of history on current  institutions, o, becomes smaller in absolute  value and the
27.  Suppose  thatg,  =g+u,, i=l,..,N are  N  noisy  indicators  of g,  with  E[u,=0, E[u']=a,, and
2  2
E[u, *  u,] =0  for all i and j. Then  the correlation  between any  two  indicators  is r, =  g  8
.0g  +0  0  +0
One  minus  the  minimum  and  maximum  correlation  across  all  pairs  i  and j  provide  upper  and  lower  bounds,




2 1variance  in the error term  in equation  5 becomes  smaller. The lower panel of table 5 shows the effects of
assumptions  regarding  the  correlation  between  the  error terms  in equations  4 and  5. The  larger  is this
correlation  (as  it  moves from negative  to positive  values), the  smaller  (more  negative)  is the  estimated
magnitude of the reverse causation from  income to governance, and the  larger (in absolute  value)  are the
effects of history and the variance of the error term.
The main message from table 5 is that measurement  error in governance  needs to be very large to
admit the possibility of positive feedback from per capita income to governance.  We have  already pointed
to the basic  intuition for this result in the discussion of equation  8 above.  In the absence of measurement
error in governance,  the substantially  larger IV estimates of equation 4 relative to the OLS estimates must
reflect  the  fact  that  the  instrument  is  either  removing  negative  feedback  from  per  capita  income  to
governance or removing the effect of omitted variables  that are uncorrelated  with the instrument  but that
move governance and per capita income  in opposite directions.
Table  5  adds  to  this  basic  intuition  the  quantitative  observation  that  for  all  but  very  high
assumptions  regarding  measurement  error  in governance,  the  attenuation  bias  in  the  OLS  estimates  is
insufficient to rule out negative feedback  from per capita  income to governance.  In fact, the only way to
get positive feedback from per capita  income to governance  is to assume either that measurement error  in
governance  is  very  large  or that  there  are  some  omitted  variables  that move  governance  and  income
strongly  in opposite directions-and  it is hard to think of plausible candidates  for such omitted  variables.
Otherwise,  this  very standard  empirical  model,  together  with the  data we  use,  is  inconsistent  with  the
notion  that there  is positive  feedback  from per capita income  to governance.  Rather, the model suggests
that feedback from incomes to governance  is, if anything, negative.
The  estimates  of the  other  two  parameters  of equation  5-namely,  the  effects  of history  on
governance  and  the  variance  of the  residual-also  have  interesting  interpretations.  Note  first that the
direct effects of history on governance  in equation  5 are smaller the larger  we assume  measurement error
in  governance  to  be.  The  reason  for this  is  as  follows.  As  measurement  error  in  governance  becomes
larger,  the  estimated  feedback  from  per  capita  income  to  governance  becomes  less  negative.  If this
feedback  effect were to become  positive  and  large, better values of the history variable only need to have
small  effects  in  order to trigger  a very  powerful  virtuous  circle  of better governance  leading to  higher
incomes  leading  to  better  governance.  Therefore,  the  coefficient  on  the  history variable  in  equation  5
would not need to be very large to match the observed correlation  between  history  and per capita income
today.  In contrast,  if measurement error  in governance  is small and feedback from incomes to governance
is negative, then history  needs to exert a large direct effect on governance  in the absence of such virtuous
circles.
22Table  5 also  shows  that if we  assume  measurement  error  in  governance  to  be  very  large,  the
variance  of the error term  in equation  5 becomes  small.  This  is  because  we choose  this  parameter  to
match the observed  fit of the  first-stage regression  of governance  on history.  If we  assume that there  is
very  large measurement  error in the dependent variable  (governance)  in equation  5, then the only way we
can match  the good fit of the first-stage  regression  is if the variances  of the  errors  in the two structural
equations  are  small.  Thus,  if we  assume  that  measurement  error  in  governance  is  unrealistically  very
large,  our estimates of equation 5 indicate  that most of the variation  in governance  is  accounted  for by
only  two  variables-income  and  history.  For  more  reasonable  values  of  measurement  error  in
governance,  income  and  history  play  a  smaller  role  in  understanding  cross-country  differences  in
governance.
Figure  4  more  systematically  illustrates  the  relative  importance  of  income,  history,  and  other
factors  in  determining  institutions  for  the  countries  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean,  under  the
benchmark  assumption  that  a,, = 0.27.  Consider  first  the  importance  of history.  As  already  shown  in
figure 3, the Latin American and Caribbean countries all fall close to the mean of the world distribution of
the  history  instrument.  The  contribution  of history  to deviations  between  governance  in  Latin  America
and  the  Caribbean  and  the rest  of the  world  is  therefore  small.  In  contrast,  the  effects  of income  on
institutions  in Latin America  and the  Caribbean  are  large  in  absolute  value for  all countries.  Given  our
finding of negative  feedback,  the contribution of income  levels to governance  tends to be positive  in the
poorer countries and negative in the richer countries of the region.  Finally, under the  realistic benchmark
assumption  of the  measurement  error  in governance,  we find  a  substantial  unexplained  component  of
governance  in Latin America and the Caribbean, which  is roughly evenly dispersed  between positive and
negative values.
This means that the  fact that countries  in Latin America and the Caribbean  tend to fall below the
OLS  regression  line  of per  capita  income  on  rule of law (as  discussed  in  the  introduction)  should  not
necessarily be  interpreted  as evidence  that governance  in the region  is surprisingly  bad given  its income
levels.  In  fact,  once  we  take into  account  the  negative  effect of incomes  on governance,  as  well as the
(small)  effects  of  history,  countries  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  do  not  appear  to  have
systematically  good  or  bad  governance  relative  to  the  rest  of  the  world.  Only  if  we  assume  that
measurement  error  in governance  is very large  do we find sufficient evidence  of positive  feedback from
per capita income to governance to justify the  idea that governance  in Latin  America and the Caribbean is
systematically worse than would be expected given its income levels.
23Interpreting Negative Feedback from Incomes to Governance
The  remainder  of this  section  discusses  and  interprets  the rather  surprising  finding of negative
feedback from  incomes to governance.  Our first point is that the negative  or zero feedback  result is quite
robust, in the sense that the degree  of measurement error required to overturn  it is very large  indeed.  For
instance,  if cru  were  equal  to  its  high-end  value  of 0.54,  then  the  90  percent  confidence  intervals  for
governance would  be twice  as large  as those shown in  figure 2 (based on actual data). These confidence
intervals based on the high-end value are  so large as to make the  aggregate rule of law indicator virtually
meaningless:  they  imply  that rule of law  in  Mexico  (which  ranks  near the  middle  of countries  in Latin
America and the Caribbean)  is not statistically significantly different from that in either Haiti (the country
with the lowest score  in the region) or Chile (the country  with the highest score).  Since we do think that
the country  rankings  in the governance  indicators  are  informative,  we  find this degree  of measurement
error to be implausibly high.
Even  if we took  the broader  interpretation  of measurement  error,  in which  rule  of law  itself is
only a proxy for more general notions of institutional quality, we would still  be forced to the conclusion
that  our  rule  of  law  index  is  virtually  uninformative  about  cross-country  differences  in  broader
conceptions of govemance-a  conclusion we find extreme. Finally, if-as is plausible-there  are omitted
variables  in  equations  4  and  5 that  drive  income  and  governance  in  the  same  direction,  then  the
measurement errors would have to  be even larger than the high-end ones suggested above in order to find
positive  feedback from  per capita  income  to governance.  All  of these factors  suggest that the  extent  of
measurement  error  required  to  deliver  positive  feedback  from  per  capita  income  to  governance  is
implausibly large.
Our  second  point  is  that  our  cross-sectional  empirical  framework  of  levels  of  income  and
govemance  is  designed  to  capture  the  interactions  between  these variables  in the very  long  run.  This
means that our finding of negative feedback does not have a short-run time-series  interpretation  along the
lines of "rapid growth  in country X over the next five years is likely to worsen governance."  Nor does our
finding of negative  feedback imply a negative  unconditional  cross-sectional  correlation between  incomes
and governance.  After all, the observed  positive cross-sectional  correlation  between levels of incomes and
govemance  is dominated  by the strong causal effects of governance  on per capita income  in the very  long
run. Rather,  our finding of negative  feedback  says that we should  only expect  to find a negative  partial
correlation  (controlling  for  history)  between  governance  and  purely  exogenous  factors  associated  with
higher income levels in a cross section of countries.
This,  however,  brings  us  to  our  third  point:  it  is  difficult  to  observe  direct  evidence  of this
negative feedback  in the form of some variable that is correlated  positively with incomes  and negatively
24with  governance  in  a  cross  section  of countries.  This  is  because  it  is  difficult  to  FIND  con-vincing
examples of purely exogenous variables that would affect incomes and growth in the long run but have no
direct effects  on institutional  quality,  such that their correlation  with governance  would purely reflect the
negative  feedback.  In  fact,  were  such  variables  (affecting  incomes  but  not  governance)  to  exist,  they
would  be  natural  instruments  for directly  identifying  the effects  of per capita income  on governance  in
equation  5. But again, convincing  instruments for income  levels in a cross section of countries  are scarce,
and this is what motivates our indirect approach  to identifying feedback from  income  to governance.  It is
more likely  that variables  that matter  for income  levels  in the  long run (such as  favorable  geographical
location,  political stability, natural resource  abundance,  and enlightened policymaking)  are also positively
correlated with institutional  quality through  a variety of other mechanisms.  As long as these direct effects
are sufficiently  large,  it will not be possible to observe a negative correlation between these variables and
governance  driven  by the  indirect  negative  feedback  that  we  have  identified.  Thus  while  our negative
feedback  result  is  quite  robust,  it  is  also  difficult  to  observe  directly  in  the  form  of a  positive  cross-
sectional  correlation  between  some  variable  and  income  and  a negative  correlation  between that same
variable and institutional  quality.
How, then, should we interpret this finding of negative feedback? First, negative feedback  implies
that improvements  in institutional  quality or governance  are unlikely to occur merely as a consequence of
economic  development.  As countries  become  richer,  higher incomes  do not necessarily  lead to demands
for better  institutional  quality,  despite  conventional  wisdom  to  the  contrary.  In  fact,  just the opposite
might occur.  As long as the established elites within a country reap private benefits from the status quo of
low-quality institutions, there is little reason to expect that higher incomes will lead to demands  for better
governance.  The phenomena of crony capitalism  in East Asia, of elite influence,  cronyism, and regulatory
capture  in  Latin  America,  and  of state capture  in  transition  economies  provide  vivid  examples  of the
conflict between  the interests of the elite and the need for better institutional  quality.
Second, negative feedback  is an  indication of the absence of virtuous circles from higher incomes
to  better  institutions  which  in  turn  support  higher  incomes  in  the very  long  run.  Consequently,  small
interventions  to  improve  institutional  quality  are  unlikely  to  make  much  difference  in  the  long  run.
Together,  these  two implications  point to the  urgency of improving  governance  in  countries  where  it is
weak. But cross-country  analysis such as this provides neither guidance  as to how this should be done nor
possible explanations  of results such  as the negative  feedback  presented above.  In the  last section of this
paper,  we draw on experience  with governance  diagnostics within  selected countries  in Latin America to
address both issues.
25IMPROVING GOVERNANCE
The  first result of this paper-that  governance  matters  significantly for growth  in the very  long
run-is not new, and  it validates  earlier such findings.  The second result, however,  is new.  It suggests that
improvements  in  governance  will  not  occur  automatically  as  the  development  process  unfolds;  no
virtuous  circle  will  suddenly  begin  to  operate.  These  results  suggest  that  interventions  to  improve
governance  are warranted.  Unfortunately,  however, the  cross-country  evidence  presented thus far is  not
very informative  for policymakers  intent on formulating  and implementing  specific strategies  to improve
governance  in their countries.
In the past few years,  the World Bank has designed and implemented  detailed  country diagnostic
surveys that provide insights  and help identify  specific actions to improve governance.  These governance
and anticorruption  diagnostics  rely on  in-depth, country-specific  surveys of thousands of public-service
users, firms, and public officials,  in order to gather specific information  about institutional vulnerabilities
within  a  country.  These  separate  surveys  permit  triangulation  and  consistency  checks  for the  results
across respondent  categories,  while probing  in more detail  into a broad array of governance  issues  within
countries.  So far, the surveys have been applied to a score of countries worldwide.28
One of the  innovations  in these surveys has been their emphasis  on unbundling  governance  and
corruption  into  more  specific  dimensions.  This has  helped to  highlight the  causes,  consequences,  and
costs  of various  forms  of misgovernance,  and  it  has  shown  how  institutional  quality  can  vary  widely
across  institutions within a particular  country.29 The results from three recent country  governance studies
in Latin America are indicative  of the multiple dimensions of  corruption  worldwide. Figure 5 summarizes
evidence from Colombia, Honduras,  and Peru on the prevalence  of four distinct dimensions of corruption:
the  frequency  of bribery  in  obtaining  services,  in public  procurement,  in  the  budget  process,  and  in
shaping the formation of the policy, legal, and regulatory  framework.
This  section focuses  on the last  form of corruption,  which we call state capture.  State  capture  is
defined  as the undue  and illicit influence of the elite in shaping the  laws, policies, and regulations  of the
state.  In  its emphasis on the formulation  and  shaping of state laws and regulations,  state capture  departs
28.  For  details  on  governance  diagnostic  instruments  and  country  reports,  visit
www.worldbank.org/wbilgovernance/tools.htm.
29.  These in-depth  diagnostics,  which  complement  insights  from the composite  governance  indicators  presented in
earlier  sections, can  provide  specific inputs for action programs  at the country level by:  i) unbundling  governance
and corruption into more  detailed  and specific  dimensions  and assessing the relative importance  and prevalence  of
the unbundled  components;  ii) assessing the quality  of govemance  and  performance  of the  key institutions  within
the country;  iii) assessing the costs of various  forms of misgovemance  (such as through the link to poverty or to the
quality  and  extent  of  service  delivery);  iv)  identifying  the  most  important  factors  affecting  governance  and
performance  (such as external  versus internal  accountability mechanisms, as well as issues of undue influence  by the
elite and state capture); and v) identifying priorities for action (based on the above items).
26from  the  conventional  view  of corruption,  which  centers  on  how  bribery  is  used  to  influence  the
implementation  of  such  laws  and  regulations.  Recent  research  has  identified  state  capture  as  a
fundamental  governance  challenge  in  many  transition  economies,  and  emerging  evidence  from Latin
America suggests the importance of capture in this region, as well. 30
State Capture
A  possible  explanation  for the  negative  feedback  from  per capita  income to  governance  is the
phenomenon  of state capture.  If the fruits of income growth  largely  accrue to an elite that benefits  from
misgovernance,  then any possible positive  impact of income growth on governance  could be offset by the
effect  of the  elite's  negative  influence.  The  recent  in-depth  empirical  research  on transition  economies
finds that state capture  is pervasive  in  many of these countries.  Yet state capture  clearly  is not unique to
this  region  in the past decade.  Many  other countries  have  gone  through  periods  of illicit  influence  by
powerful  elites in their past; the influence of the  so-called robber barons in the United States at the turn of
the  twentieth  century  is  one  such  illustration.  Other  research  focuses  on  crony  capitalism  in  the
Philippines under Marcos and on Mexico during the long era of dominance by the Partido Revolucionario
Institucional  (PR). 3 '  Such  cronyism  is  often  a  somewhat  subtler  form  of the  coarse  manifestations  of
capture  by oligarchs  found  in the  early  years  of transition  to  a  market  economy  in the  former  Soviet
Union, but nevertheless  it is  indicative of serious governance  failures in the interface  between the private
and  public  sectors.  Even  the  recent  spate  of scandals  associated  with  lax  regulatory  and  legislative
oversight  in the accounting  practices by influential firms in the United States suggests yet another variant
of this private-public  misgovernance  nexus.
The  Business Environment  and  Enterprise  Performance  Survey  (BPS)  carried  out  in  1999  in
twenty-four post-socialist economies  provides insights  on the phenomenon of state capture.32 This survey
measured  state  capture  by  asking  firms  about  the  prevalence  of illicit  private  "purchases"  of laws,
decrees,  and  regulations  by firms,  and  about the  impact  of such purchases  by other firms  on their own
enterprise.  The  survey  measured  not  only  the  conventional  types  of bureaucratic  and  administrative
30.  For details  on recent research  on  state capture,  see Heilman and  others (2000);  Hellman,  Jones,  and Kaufinann
(2001);  www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/wp-statecapture.htm.
31.  See Haber (2001).
32. The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance  Survey (BPS), developed jointly by the World Bank and
the  European  Bank  for Reconstruction  and Development  (EBRD),  is a survey  of over 4,000  firms  in twenty-four
transition  countries carried  out in  1999-2000,  examining a wide  range of interactions between  firms  and  the state.
Based  on  face-to-face  interviews  with  firm  managers  and  owners,  BPS  was  designed  to  generate  comparative
measurements  inter  alia  on  corruption,  state  capture,  lobbying,  rule  of law,  and  the  quality  of the  business
environment,  which  was then related  via statistical  analysis  to specific  firm characteristics  and  firm performance.
For details, visit info.worldbank.org/governance/beeps/.
27corruption  related to the implementation  of the laws and regulations,  but also undue and illegal  influence
in shaping such laws and regulations.  The results from the BPS survey point to a high prevalence of state
capture in transition  economies. In countries such as Moldova,  Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan, well over
30 percent  of the firms reported  that they had been  significantly  (or very  significantly)  affected  by  the
prevalence of state capture in their industry.33
The econometric  results based  on this large multi-country  enterprise  survey indicated  that captor
firms (which  engage  in  illicit activities  to shape the  state laws  and regulations)  do,  in  fact,  derive  very
large  benefits  from  such  strategies.  Captor  firms  exhibited  much  higher  output and  investment  growth
than  their noncaptor  counterparts,  controlling  for other factors.  In contrast,  firms  that were coerced  into
paying bribes  for administrative  corruption derived  little private  benefit from  these bribes.  Yet while the
captor firms  benefit  in terms of growth  from their  private purchase of policies,  regulations,  and law and
order,  public  provision  of rule  of law  is  further  undermined  by  these  capture  strategies.  Indeed,  the
statistical  evidence  suggests  that public protection of property  rights for the overall  enterprise sector was
substantially lower  in countries  in which capture  was prevalent. This evidence  suggests a pattern in which
the large private  benefits derived from  capture provide  an insidious  built-in  incentive  for the persistence
of such capture, as the growing economic might of powerful  captor firms supports even more capture and
34 further deteriorations  in overall governance.
Do  similar  patterns  apply  to  Latin  American  countries?  In  contrast  with  the  work  already
undertaken  in  transition  economies,  a  comprehensive  cross-country  empirical  investigation  of  the
phenomenon  of state capture  has yet to be undertaken  in the Latin American  region, though  it is part of
the  upcoming  research  agenda.  At this  stage,  the empirical  evidence  is  of a select  nature;  it is  mainly
derived from the recent country governance  diagnostics  in a small number of countries  in the region.  The
results of these diagnostics suggest that the challenge of state capture  is also present in Latin America.
The  emerging  results  from  diagnostics  in  Colombia,  Honduras,  and  Peru  point  to  capture  by
influential  forces outside the state as a major governance challenge. Further details on the particular  forms
of state capture  can  be found  in the responses  of public officials  and  enterprise  managers.  For example,
figure  6  summarizes  results  for  Colombia  and  Peru  as  reported  by  the  public  officials  survey,  with
enterprise  managers  reporting  similar  results  independently  (not  shown).  Both  enterprises  and  public
officials  consistently  point  to  pervasive  capture of legal  and judiciary  institutions.  In Peru,  survey data
33.  The empirical  analysis  of this issue was made  possible thanks to the BPS survey design. Yet  the notion of state
capture  was  far  from  alien  for  the  media  and  politicians.  One  notable  illustration  was  the  statement  by  Russian
President Vladimir Putin  in his opening remarks to a roundtable  of twenty-one  top Russian companies  and banks:  "I
only want to draw your attention to the fact that you have yourselves  formed this very state, to a large extent through
political  and  quasi-political  structures  under your  control.  So what you should do  least of all  is blame  the mirror"
(president.kremlin.ru/text/APPTemplAppearld  10623 .shtml  [July 2000])
28collected  in early 2001  indicated that powerful groups outside the public  sector had an undue influence in
shaping the policies, laws, and regulations of the state.
This  incipient empirical  evidence from some countries in Latin America,  as well as the empirical
results  from other  regions,  permits  us  to  speculate  as  to the  role  of capture  in explaining  the  'growth-
without-governance  'puzzle.  To  the  extent  that  state  capture  is  important,  higher  incomes  may  be
appropriated by the monopolistic captors or elites. This,  in turn, can lead to additional demand for private
purchase of laws and regulations ensuring the continued dominance of the elite. The net effect is to erode
overall governance,  particularly the public protection of property rights,  the incidence  of corruption, and
more broadly, rule of law.
This increasing  demand for capture in a situation  of economic  growth may be further  abetted by
the fact that the A  la carte supply of laws, regulations,  and policies offered by politicians  to powerful elites
is  less likely to be subject to checks and balances  in such an environment.  This  is due to the widespread
complacency  about governance  in economies  with good performance  contributes to relatively lax  internal
and external  pressures to  improve  governance.  This was the case  in Indonesia under Suharto throughout
the  1980s and much of the  1990s, but Indonesia  is not alone. Argentina  in the  1990s is  another extreme
illustration, while Mexico during the previous captured  political era of crony capitalism  serves as a more
nuanced example.35 Russia during different historical  periods are  also telling, as well as the recent  events
related  to  major  failures  in  corporate  governance  and  regulatory  oversight  of  very  powerful  U.S.
companies are also suggestive.
Thus  far,  the  links  between  state  capture  and  the  negative  feedback  between  incomes  and
governance  that we  have documented  are of a  speculative  nature,  and they call  for  further  research.  As
data become  available on the degree of capture  by elite interests  in  a  large number of countries  in Latin
America  and other nontransition regions,  it  will  be possible  to put  this preliminary  hypothesis  through
further empirical tests.  In particular,  it will be possible to empirically  investigate the socioeconomic  costs
of  various  dimensions  of  capture  in  Latin  America,  as  has  already  been  done  among  transition
36 economies.
34. Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2001).
35.  Haber (2001);  Haber,  Maurer,  and  Razo  (2001). For a general treatment  of the negative  implications  of crony
capitalism  for growth,  see Krueger (2001).
36. The  media in Latin  America  is increasingly  taking up the issue of state capture,  as has been  the case  for years
now  in  the  former  Soviet  states.  See,  for  instance,  the  editorial  entitled  "El  Estado  Capturado"  in the  leading
Colombian  newspaper,  El Tiempo, 21  February 2002.
29Implications for Reform
At a general  level of strategy design, the empirical analysis of the governance diagnostics  provide
important  country-specific  inputs  for  action  and  reform.  In  many  countries,  these  surveys  have
highlighted the variety of forns of corruption and identified institutions afflicted by misgovernance  and in
which corruption  is particularly  pervasive.  Given the prominence  we ascribe  to state capture  and  related
forms of influence  by the elite  in providing  a plausible  explanation of why growth may not translate into
improved  governance,  then strategies to improve governance  and combat corruption ought to specifically
address  such undue  influence  and capture.  This  implies a strategy  that departs from conventional  public
sector reform,  which  typically focuses on  the  internal  management  and functioning  within government.
The research  on  state capture  for transition  economies,  as well  as analysis of govemance  diagnostics  in
some Latin American  countries,  point to the importance of voice and external accountability  mechanisms,
of political  contestability,  and of transparency  reforms  (including  media  freedom, disclosure of votes by
parliamentarians,  declaration  of assets by politicians,  and regular  monitoring  through  surveys and report
cards).  This  necessitates  a  move  towards  collective-action  modalities,  including  not  only  selected
agencies  in  the  executive,  but  reformists  throughout,  including  the  parliament  , civil  society,  and  the
private sector. 37
Similar  lessons  emerge  from  an  earlier  governance  diagnostic  survey  carried  out  in  Bolivia,
where over  1,200 public officials working  in over one hundred public agencies  were  interviewed in depth
on  diverse  dimensions  of institutional  performance  and  governance  vulnerabilities.  Figure  8 shows the
relationship  across  government  agencies  in  Bolivia  between  either  the  reported  prevalence  of
administrative  forms  of bribery  (as  well  as  state  capture  manifestations)  (the  vertical  axis)  and  three
possible  reform  dimensions  (the horizontal  axis):  (i)  transparency  (with  regard  to  budgets,  personnel
management,  and administration);  (ii)  the existence of citizen feedback  mechanisms (which  are acted  on
by the agency);  and (iii)  their reported  employee  satisfaction with  regard to pecuniary  and nonpecuniary
compensation.  Each of these three possible reform dimensions  is depicted  in one of the panels in figure  8
on the horizontal axis.  The first two panels  show a clear  association between  transparency  and external
feedback mechanisms,  on the one hand,  and corruption (including state capture), on the other, controlling
for other  factors.  In  contrast,  there  is  little if any association  between  the  public officials'  response  on
their  perceived  satisfaction  with  their  pay  and  bribery  or  capture.  While  the  structural  relationship
between  determinants of corruption  and capture  and such  governance  outcomes  is  likely to vary across
37.  While  the  involvement  of nongovernmental  organizations  and  related  civil  society  segments  as  agents  to
improve  governance  has  become  more  prominent  in  recent  years,  the  role  of  the  competitive  private  sector
(including associations  of traders, exporters,  and small and medium-sized  enterprises) has been underemphasized.
30countries  (as  demonstrated  by  evidence  emerging  from different  governance  diagnostics),  this  type of
evidence casts doubt on the traditional public sector management approach to anticorruption,  which tends
to focus  uniformly on issues of pay and internal  monitoring and supervision.  Rather, these  findings point
to the  importance  of open  access  to  information  and  effective  external  monitoring  (inter  alia through
providing  'voice'  to the public  service users)  as important in reducing  corruption,  improving governance,
and mitigating state capture.38
In  sum,  countries  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  urgently  need  strategies  to  improve
governance,  given  concerns  about existing  quality.  Even  when  growth  resumes  in  these  countries,  one
should  not  expect  automatic  improvements  in  governance  to  occur  without  the  implementation  of
substantial  interventions.  The design  of governance  and  institutional  reform  strategies  should  rely  on
country-specific  know-how  and  governance  diagnostic  tools  to  identify  specific  priorities.  And
understanding the political and economic forces  shaping policymaking and  lawmaking  (which vary from
setting to setting) is key to the identification of realistic and country-relevant  strategic priorities.
Where  state capture prevails,  the governance  quality of the growth dividend may be very  low, if
any.  The  vulnerability  of sustained  growth  prospects  is  thus  high,  necessitating  specific  strategies  to
address such capture.  Such strategies  would  need to consider  political reforms, which have  been  under-
emphasized  in the past. But conventional  economic  reforms may not be  sustained without them, even  if
they are implemented  in the first place. Furthermore,  the specific institutional reforms need to depart from
both a narrow focus  on traditional  public  sector management and  an excessive  focus on legal fiat or on
rules-based  measures.  Instead,  much  more  emphasis  must  be  placed  on  promoting  mechanisms  of
external accountability,  voice,  participation, and transparency.
38.  Kaufmann,  Mehrez,  and  Gurgur  (2002)  provide  a more  systematic  analysis  of these  points  and  present  the
econometric  results in detail.
31Appendix  1: Details of Identification Procedure
The reduced form of the system defined by equations 4 and 5 in terms of observables is
(Al)  gJ  = (1  - y -,  *+  y  c+  o- xi + y- e  + VJ)+  U  and
(Al)  y ,an
(A2)  y;  =(1-y.I3)~'.(a+I3i±+I3.8.xj  +e1+  I.V1)+WJ.
Equation 4 in terms of observables is
(A3)  y 1 =a+,B-g; +e,  - -uj +w,.
The model  in equations  4 through  7 has ten  unknown  parameters (a,  3,  B,  y, O, p, ae,  CS  , a2
and  cy 2  ). In the data,  we have seven independent  pieces of sample information.  These  are the estimated
intercepts,  slopes and variances  of the residuals of the first-  and second-stage  regressions that deliver the
two-stage  least squares  estimates  of the effects of governance  on income  in  equation  1, as  well as  the
estimated OLS slope coefficient from a regression  of per capita income on governance.
As  discussed  in  the text,  we  augment this  sample  information  with  three assumptions  that pin
down the values of  cy2  (the variance  of the measurement  error  in govemance),  a2  (the variance  of the
measurement error  in  log per capita GDP),  and p (the correlation between the error terms in equations  4
and 5). We assume throughout that the  stability condition, (I - y * f3 > 0,  holds. Note that this places an
upper bound on the amount of feedback from per capita income to governance, that is, y < 1/,.
With these three assumptions  in hand,  we solve the remaining  seven equations,  linking the seven
pieces  of sample  information  with the seven  remaining  parameters,  as follows.  The  intercept  and slope
from  the second-stage  regression  give  us estimates of a and  ,B.  From  Equation A3,  the variance  of the
residuals in the second-stage  regression  isCy2  + p2  _ a2 + U2  , which gives us an estimate of c2 . Note that
the  restriction  that  cae  > 0  places  an  upper  bound  on  our  assumptions  regarding  the  variance  of
measurement error in per capita income and governance..
Finally, we (numerically) solve the following three equations for 6,  y, and cy  v
((A4)  ,r_=  S 
2  2  2
A  i2  = Y  2e  2-YvP+ae  <v  +UV  2 (AS)  2  Y  *(YU  and
62  13.  2  + y  +.  13  a2 +2(1  +jy  13).  p  . e 
(A6)  POLS  = o2  2 +±y 2 .a  +U  2  + 2 YPOe  +(1-Y.p3) 2 .2
32where  *c, and  &2  denote the  slope coefficient  and estimated variance  of the residuals  in  the first-stage
regression  of  governance  on  the  instrument,  x;  i3OLS  denotes  the  slope  coefficient  from  and  OLS
regression of log per capita GDP on governance;  and  CY2  is just the variance of the instrument, x, which
we estimate  directly from the data. Finally,  with these estimates  in hand, we obtain j. from the estimated
intercept  in the first-stage regression,
so= 1-e  y3
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Gambia  .. 40.73  04a2`  0.97  0.29  2  0.49  0.65  uA]  0 56  0.41  .?'4l'  0.531  jA~  ~  0.16  0.77 
Georgia  -0D,07  19  5  -0.25  0.23  3  -1.00  .0.41  4~-0.76  0.31  3  -.0.72  0.277"'  -0.51  0.30  3
Germany  1.~~~42  02:7,  1.46  0.25  5  1.21  :0.22  -9  1.32  0.25  6  1.67  0.9is  j  141  .2  7
Ghana  0.02  0O.24  5.J  -0.43  0.25  4  1-0.11  0.29  ,f5.,-.0  .2  6-.0  '25`-.:  ~'  029  02 
Greece  12  .24  '44  10  025  4  0.79.  024  6  0.21  0.26  5  .0.5  9.20  74  0.56  0.25  6
Guatemala  -0:33  .0.24  1-S1  -0.56  0.25  3  -0.77'  0.30  '5--  -0.75  0.32  3  -.. 63-  .022,  6  -0.23  0.37  2
Guinea  '  -. 98  0.28  £2]-0.87  0.29  3  -0.99  0.65,  1  1.03  0.7  2  [.1  05  ,I;  -0.03  0.51  2
Guinea-Bissau  4087  0.27  -~3  -0.45  0.29  3  -1.21  0.51  -1.20  0.37  2  -1.48  0.40  2I  -0.33  0.51  2
Guyana  -0.94  -~0.27  >4'  1.01  0.29  2  O4.70  'O 51  2-  -0.20  0.41  1  .0.02  0.40  .4  0.01  0.77  1
Haiti  -0.80  0.27  4  '  071  0.29  2  '.38,  0.49  3  17  .1  1  11.2  .7  -3-.  -. 3  07 
Honduras  -0:04  .024  006  0.25  3  0.-25  ,0.30  '  - "  0.33  0.32  3  -O  8,-  iO.23  --5  -0.41  0.37  2
Hong Kong-  -0.33~  0,24  ,-A'j  0.01  0.25  6  f4113  0.25  6'0.92  0.27  5  1:10  ;-0.21  i~rl  1.25  0.25  6
Hungay  J,  0.16  1  1.22  0.19  6  1 0,  '  .22  "  1.25  0.22y  7  O60,4O~7~-  1  .6-.2
Iceland  IJ.53.  0.27.  4.  t5177-029  0.40  4  1.25  0.37  2  ~-'.3,  0'  O3~,  '4  1.50  0.41  3
India  0.66  0.24-  6.,  0.36  0.25  6  [ -0  0  . 022  8  -0.04  0.25  6  -0. 17,  0J0..26  0.23  7
Indonesia  ',04  .4  61  -. 3  02  ~  i6  0.22  8  1.29  0.26  5  ; -0.50  0."O18  19".0.53  0.25  6
Iran  -0,36  0.24  -4j  -0.56  0.25  3  L0.02  02,  0.13  0.28  4  L-1.2t  '- 0.22  .5  -0.34  0.29  4
35Iraq  -19"Y4  VJ  1.75  0.25  3  f?46  A  C2-2.24  0.30  3  KI4  O4.  4i  1.88  0 32  3
Ireland  1.53  0.2556'1.24  .43  j25'  -J7  09  7j  1.36  0.23  7
Israel  KQ.2'V  5  12 1.06  0.25  4  '0-'4.-  '0:241:'  6.,  -0.46  0.28  4  .0.7  020'7)O  0.69  0.27  5
Italy  .IQ  023  7  1.28  0.25  5  :98'  '02  . 1.16  0.25  6  0'6S.11  018'  'io  0.77  0123  7
Jamaica  0.18  0~~~  ~~~25  3  0.75  0.25  4  V0 5 O  033.  "~3  I -0.34  0.32  3  -030  06-6  .3  -0.48  0 33  3
Japan  13  '03  6  1.14  0.28  4  Li1  20  . 023  8  1.15  0.29  4  0-93  '-0-19-  '9  0.84  0.31  5
Jordan  00  24  4  0.15  0.2  4  KO13  07  -5,  -00  .7  5  0'P42  0.22-  5  0.63  0.26  5
Kazakhstan  'i_-080  0 16'  7  -0.69  0.19  5  109'  02  T  0122  0122  6  '-0-6!  0F 9  -0.82  0123  6
Kenya  -08  04  5  07  .5  4  -083  027  5;.  -1.10  0.27  5  -06  0  09  .2  6
Korea, North  -4  2  08  9I  1.79  0.29  2  I09  51  2  0.37  0.41  1  1,-  -92  .9  -05  06--' 040  2  -0.30  0.77  1
Korea,  South  '0.9'8'  03  -6  i  0.91  0.25  6  ['  50"  02')  '8  - 0.16  0.25  6  '044'O 19: -9"  0.41  0.23  7
Kuwait  %016081  '025  4.3.  006  :4.9'06  03  .1303
Kyrgyz, Republic  -0  2"'~%6  -OV  0.3  0.31  -O..%6  '  0  2.3j.  -0.06  0.32  3
Laos  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~105~~~~~~L  0O3 6  ,2  -1.05  0.36  1  O000  63"  i  V0  9  5 
Latvia  016. t'"'O  16  0.75  0.19  5  1-Oo  50  0918  ,,.  .106  023  5  0'62  0I  6  0.07  0124  5
Lebanon  '3'-0.40  0.25  3  j  -05:"  02 8  4  -0.25  0.30  3  - 4002.  -0.24  4..  0.17  0.32  3
Lesotho  ~~~~~~-0  5  039'-  -0.15  0.36  1  [pr-  -- 0.82  0.61  1  r.-0.46  0.33  2
Liberia  "'1  04  0.27-~  3'  -0.89  0.29  2  -0Q65  0!  2  -. 5  .4  1  -094  0:40  2  -. 2  07 
Libya  I  5  '  3  i5025  3  I  1.35  0 25  3  1,.-0:38i  0.29  3.  -1.17  0.30  3  Ij  -1  -'O!6'  3  -1.32  0.32  3
Lithuania  100  016  7  ~~~0.88  0.19  5  I0.29'.  ,0;26  7-  0.35  0.23  5  [026'  019  9  0.1  0.24  5
Luxembourg  14,  07  4  1.49  0.29  3  148  043  3 ;'i  1.40  0.37  2  hi86:  041I  3  1.67  0.41  3
Macedonia (former  . -1
Yugoslav  Rep. of)  '003-  0:18'  4A  0.09  0.21  4  j1.145,  0.37:  9,,'  -0.40  0.31  3  [J.063  0 '8:  _3  -0.58  0127  3
Madagascar  0.28  '-O 27  4  O1  031  0.29  3  §','-:O34  .0-49',  3 .'  -0.79  0.37  2  '-035  -0.37  :"3-  -0129  0.39  3
Malawi  '3  03  - .4  02  -0 14,.  0.24,,  5  4  0.06  0125  4  00  3  00  09  4  -07  06  4"  -0.62  0124  5
Malaysia  '013-'  -023,  -7  K00  .2  3-1  -r0O22  .5  02  6  ,053-019  91"  0.71I  0123  7
Maldives  -01  ~~9  1  -0.91  0.36  1  '  - -
Mali  A032,  027--  -3  0.42  0.29  3  L-onU.  051  2 -1  -0.29  0.37  2  1  14  040  2  00  05
Malta  l4N~Q8  2  1.41  0.29  2  -,I05"e ',0.65  1.32  0.41  1  073  V03  '  .3  07 
Mauritania  -0906  -0.97  0.36  1  r07  06  - 166  ~2'  1-. 
Mauritius  I2  02  3ir  1.1  02  3  '1I2'032  3  1.14  0.39  3  [.076  09'-6  3  0.17  0.27  3
Mexico  0  2'2'  7]-0.11  0.25  5  K'06  2'  9  '  -0.35  0.25  6  '0.28  .'~0  IS  0Oi0.8  01'
Moldova  "-.-'O'  16  6  "  0.11  0.19  5  T9  0127'  r-,  -0120  0123  5  j:1  0'0.21  6)1.  -0.46  0124  5
Mongolia  !-O  7  -0.27.  3  0.63  0.21  3  &O?72>  O'5i  2'"  0.37  0.41  1  09  00  2]  0.02  0.39  2
Morocco  .Z023  05  -0.24  0.25  4  I'0140.29'  3~  0.9  01  01  26p?  -3-<  0127  0.22  6
Mozambique  L.d207~..3  *'-0.17  0.29  3  160".201%D001'  '  2  -0.53  0.34  3  h049<0 40-'~  -272  -0.33  0.29  4
Myanmar  ~  _  I 93,'t,:0A4  - 4  1.75  0.25  3  L '-0  018O,  '  4.28i -0.97  0.30  3  F  .25', "0"24'~  ,4  -1.46  0.32  3
Namibia  pO.3 2  ~'r  .024Xj75j  0.47  0125  3  v~52763W  44  ,  071  03'3OO  026  4J  0.04  0.26  4
Nepal  '. -006  -_D  036Sr-  '1  0.05  0.36  1  -t0.26h-.6  - - l0I4,  O052-  - "J!-  -
Netherlands  r  11  23  6  1.64  0.25  4  rhAA  O2r18<  1.48  0.26  5`I8*1Oi9  1  8  2.03  0.25  6
New Zealand  Ip*i924fLj  1.47  0.25  4  I  'l21  02..~J  1.42  0.28  4  £  '.i  IZ.jJ  1.57  0.27  5
36Nicaragua  5-r6  04-5  00  .5  3  F  .1  03  A  -0.32  0.32  3  '-.3  02  :1  -0.55  0.37  2 Niger  [OIl"  0.27  3~  -0.74  0129  2  -061  0.5St  2,  -0.76  0.41  1  ;04)  ~  f-1.39  0.77  1 Nigeria  '-044'  0.23  -6'  -1.23  0.25  4  -1.3(6  0.26  7  -10  0.27  5  -. 0  1I Norway  1.58  024  5  1  1.67  0.25  4  132  6.23  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~7  1.41  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  s  V=.l.0Q'  0:21  7  I  -1.32  0.22  6~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1.57  132  02
-. 5 1.67 0.25  4  1:3  62141  0.26  5  I13  0.0  7  1.67  0.25  6 Oman  rO  025-  3~~  -0.57  0.25  3  -1.00 - 0.28  4  0.91  03  3  0.5  0.24  41  0.90  0.32  3
Pakistan  143  024  5  I-0.44  0.25  3  ..-0.39.  ; 026  -0.65  0.26  5  i.-O48  0.22.  6.  -0.74  0.26  5 Panama  0O77  9.4 r.  0.66  0.25  3  '0.57'  4  0.15  0.30  3  1rO..14-,  .0.21  6  -0.28  0.32  3 Papua New Guinea  -0.03  0.4  J 01  .5  3  -0:48  02  4  -o0A0  0.34  2  IZO.67 -Q.24  4.,'  -0.69  0.37  2 Paraguay  I  90  2  ¼  042  0.25  4  .- 0.87  0.32  4  I-0.57  0.32  3  -1.120  -0.26  4 -I  -1.10  0.33  3 Peru  015  -0,23'  "6  -0.69  0.25  4  -0r.23  '024  R1-0.53  0125  6  -0.35-' b1  9  9  0.7  0124  6 Philippines  0-0  2230.23  7  1  0.63  0.25  5  .021.  '622  9  0.27  0.26  5  0-03  ~Q19  9j  0.13  0.25  6
Poland  1  Q1  16  S  1.12  0.19  6  -0.69  -0.22  9j08  02  7  1 .27'  0.17-  .'  0.67  0121  8
Portugal  -4  2  1.48  0.25  5  :1.41  '0.23  7  1.39  0.25  6  Q9.91  0.20  7~  1.15  0.23  7
Puerto  Rico  - - - 483  0.49  I  0.76  0.53  1  I1.38,  0.43-  ---  1.26  0.52  1 Qatar  I14  05  3I  0.8  0.25  3  1.40.  0.28  -4  - 1.38  0.30  3  0.82  0.24  4,  048  0.32  3 Romania  :0.  50  -016  "7  02  .9  4  -00-.6  7  0  0.0.4  4  -. 54  0.  19.  9'I  -0.57  0.26  4 Russia  203  .0.16.  '8'  -0.19  0.19  6  -.  .41  0.22  "  -0.69  0122  7  -0.57  0.17  1.1  -0.59  0121  8
Rwanda  -11.42036  21.--  1.17  0.36  1  -1.  160.63-  - - Vt>-  I 
Sao Tome and  . 2  03  .4  - - - V0''  '.. 
Principe  O  20 . 039.  1  36 
--- Saudi  Arabia  1.07  024  4  ~-1.10  0.25  3  '031i  0.25  0.24  0.28  4  .0  022  5  -0.35  0.29  4 Senegal  Q.12*-2  5-  -0.29  0.25  4  4,68  0.31  '<  -0.87  0.32  3  .0.16  0.26  4  0.05  0.29  4 Sierra Leone  i  -,-I,35  .2  0.27  -1.62  0.2  2  [1.26  951  2  j  -1.52  0.41  1  -1.60o  0.40  2.  0.01  0.77  1 Singapore  I.O.UI  -0.24  6  0.13  0125  6  £.44  v0.3  8  13  2  :.6  0.19  2.08  0.23  7
Slovak Republic  0.99  O: 16  7.  .2  01  -27  06  .3  63  ,9
Slovenia  7.07  01  7  1.03  0.19  4  0.7 024  7  1.09  012  0.70  0.19  0.57  0.26  4
Solomon Islands  1'0.16  0O.39  I1  1.  17  0.36  1  - '-  - - - - Somalia . - 1  ~~~~~~~~~~~~-1.69  0129  2  15S-14  .71  0.41  0 4A  170  07
South Africa  r  117  0,23  7  ~~~~~~0.99  0.25  L  0.07'  . 9J  -0.53  0124  7  -02  '0.8A10  -0.01  0.21  8 Spain  11  02If  -7  1.36  012  5  [ L0l  0  012  0.58  0125  6  14$  09  60  0123  7
Sri Lanka  -023  024  4  -0.16  015  3  -1A3  ~~~0.27  '  ")-1.63  0.30  3  -0 44  0.22  -0.61  0.32 
Sudan  A153  -0.24,  4-  i  1.50  0125  3  -- 2:01  . 2628  4.  -1.73  0.34  2  '..L134  0.24-  4.  1  L70  0.37  2 Suriname  -063  0.28  2  0.28  0.29  2  O0:12  0.65  11-0.20  OI  1  01  .3  II-.5  07 
Swaziland  -- 0-93  0.39  1  -0.78  0.36  'V  -- I-1.69  0.61  1  *  -0.47  0.33  2
Sweden  165  03  7  1.60  0125  4f  13;  .22  9  1.41  0126  5  &1519Y0  '  -91  1.57  0.25  6 Switzerland  1.73  0.23  6  1.68  0.25  5  4.1  O.2  8  1.69  0.25  6  i.9t  -0.1  9  8  1.99  0.23  7 Syria  149  02  3  13  01  3  -,Z  $2  4  0.8  0.30  3  U  0Ž4,  4  -1.18  0.32  3
Taiwan  0.83  0.23  6  0.71  0125  5  fbl  2  - . 0.94  0.26  5  0.91  019  9  j  1.29  0.25  6 Tajikistan  210.69  '0. 19  '3  1-1.13  0123  2  f.~7  04-  2'  -1.86  0.33  2  -13  .8  §<  -1A42  0.34  2
Tanzania  -0.07  - 0.24  5  :-0.28  0.25  4  0i4  9,27.  ~~  0.57  0.27  5  j-4.43O.'-  C23  '  5<-I  -0.49  0.22  6 Thailand  0.31  0.2)4  6  I  0.22  0.25  6  OI2E  0.213'  8  0.25  0.25  6  LA)  10.19,  - r  :  0.01  0.23  7
37Togo  i-I 0  02-'2  -1.05  0.29  3  -06  .5  l,  -. 1  03  3  5  - i  -0.37  0.51  2
Trinidad  and.
Tobago  ,0.61I  .0.25  4  -]  0.95  0.25  3  4  ~70.32  0.34  2  0.062  02.5  4  0.52  0.37  2
Tunisia  -0.61-  0.25  4  -0.59  0.25  3  i0.02'  4127T  S$  0.66  0.28  4  1  0  023  S}  0.63  0.24  5 Turkey  ~~~~-0~~55 ~0.23.  -7  -0.88  0.25  5  -. 5  (  9  -0.94  0.25  6  -0,  1  01-.41  0.23  7
Turkmienistan  1-1.42  . 019  2  1-1.45  0.23  2  j-Oi  ,04  .0  .3  2  [  3  0.32  -1.25  0.34  2 Uganda  -''~.79:-  0.24  5  ,-0.52  0.25  4  A.`3I §0.D2 7  -0.98  0.27  I-0.32  0623  5  -0.25  0.22  6
Ukraine  -0.31  0.16  -6  -0.05  0.19  5  Q05-  125  7  -0.24  0.22  7  ,.-0.75  09  -0.89  0.21  7
United Arab  I
Emirates  -0:51  .0.25-  ~~~3  -0.54  0.25  3  .09  ~0.29  3  0.82  0.30  3  v,0--  .2  ,3  0.4  .3 
United KinGdo  1.6-.  7  1.51  0.25  5  . .0  02  .2  0.25  6  1.7  0.18  10  19  02 
United States  1.24 -.  0:24.  6-  1.52  0.25  6  1.18  .23  '8  1.10  0.25  6  0.19  9  1.37  0.23  7
Uruguay  1.08.  0.24  5  0.77  0.25  3  I.05  -.  .2k  03  03  3  0.61  0.1  7  0.62  0.32  3
Uzbekistan  .1-A  A  0.1I8.  5  . -1.28  0.21  4  "1~  .0.29'  ;4  -0.33  0.27  4  . 0.22  5j-1.30  0.25  4
Venezuela  .-0.34  :,0.24  5  I  0.15  0.25  5  ~-0.33'  0.23.-  -0.25  0.25  6  i-0.81  0.19  .4  -0.85  0.23  7
Vietmam  -Il.29'  0.24  4  -1.45  0.25  4  0.44  0.24.~￿~  0.65  0.26  5  i-0.30  0.20  6  03  .6  5
West Bank  0.0  .0  I  -. 3  08  -. 9  09  A  .1  06  1  _  0.37  0.70  1  -0.09  0.56  1
WestemnSamoa  ~  .
Yugoslavia,  Federal  LfrLO7,~~~~~~~~~O. 31  3  2  v62 7 7 0,037 Yemen  -0.63  40,2I  -. 41  0.25  3  -- 1.47  0.34  2  .2  3  -. 67.3
Yugoslavia,  Federal~  I -
Republic  of  -0.09  0.17.  4'  -0.71  0.19  4  1 -0.48  0.34  2  -1 42  0.26  3  1,-0.97-  0.25  3.  -0.95  0.29  3
Zambia  -0.17  O.,24  5  I  -0.05  0.25  4  -0:42  O0:27  5  10.00  0.27  5  l-0.75  01.23  S  -0.40  0.22  6
Zimbabwe  -0O.90  20O.25  4  -0.67  0.25  4  -1.25  .0.28.  5.  -0.54  0 27  5  -.1.03  0.22  5  J  -1.13  0 22  6
a. Est. refers to the  point estimate  of governance, S.E.  refers to  the standard error,  and N refers to the number  of sources  in which the country  appears. Governance  indicators  are oriented  so that
higher values correspond to  better outcomes, on  a scale  from -2.5  to 2.5.  T'hese  ratings are based  on  subjective assessments  from a variety of source,  are subject  to substantial  margins of effor  as
indicated,  and  in no way  reflect the  official views of the  World Bank,  its Executive Directors,  or the countries  they represent.  These ratings are based  on subjective assessments  from a variety  of
sources  and are  subject to substantial  margins of error as indicated.
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In(Real  Per Capita  GDP at PPP,  1996)
Source:  Authors' calculations  as descnbed  in text.
a. The govemance ratings  on the vertical axis are  based on  subjective assessments  from a variety of sources  and
are subject to margins of error and  in no way reflect the official view of the World Bank,  its Executive  Directors,
of the countries they represent.
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Source: Authors'  calculations  as described  in text.
a. The governance  ratings on the vertical  axis are based  on subjective  assessments from  a variety of sources and
are subject to margins of error.
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Source  Authors'  calculations as described  in text.
a. The governance  ratings on  the vertical axis  are based on  subjective  assessments from  a variety of sources  and
are subject to margins of error.
4  1Figure 2. Imprecision  of Governance Estimatesa
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Source: Authors'  calculations as described in text.
Note. This graph  shows estimates of the indicated dimension of govemance  (on the vertical  axis) for all  countries  for which data is available (on the horizontal  axis) for
2000-01.  The  vertical  bars  show the statistically  likely range  of values  of govemance  for  each  country,  with  the midpoint of each  bar corresponding  to the best single
estimate.  The length  of these bars varies with the amount of information available for each country and the extent to which information  from different sources  correspond
with  each other.  Point estimates of govemance  for  1997-98  are indicated  as dots.  Selected  countries are  indicated  on  the horizontal  axis.  As emphasized in  the text, the
ranking of countries  along the horizontal  axis is subject to significant  margins of error,  and  thus no precise  ranking  should be inferred.  These  indicators or any  implied
orderine in no wav reflect the official  view of the World  ank  its Executive Directors.  or the countries thev re3resent
42Figure 3. Causal Effects  of Governance  op Per Capita Incomes'
IV Regression  of Per Capita Income on Governance
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Source: Authors' calculations as described in  text.
a  The  bold  (solid)  line  in the  top  panel  represent  the  IV  and  OLS  regression  lines,  respectively.  The
governance  ratings are based on subjective  assessments from a variety of sources and are subject to substantial
margins  of error,  and in no  way  reflect  the official  view of the  World  Bank,  its  Executive  Directors,  or the
countries they represent.
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are  subject  to  substantial  margins  of error,  and  in  no  way  reflect  the  official  view  of  the  World  Bank,  its
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44Figure 5. Prevalence of Different Forms of Corruption in Colombia, Honduras, and Perua
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Source  World  Bank Institute (2001).
a.  The  graph  shows  the  percent  of public  officials  rating  the  indicated  forms  of bribery  as  being  frequent  or  very
frequent, based  on separate surveys of public officials  carried out in 2001  (different months).
45Figure 6. Extent of State Capture in Colombia and Peru'
Impact of Bribes to:
Parliamentarians  to shape laws
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Regulatory agencies to influence  regulatory regime
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%  of firms report high impact of type of corruption/capture  on business environment
Source.  World Bank Institute Governance  Diagnostic (2001).
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47Figure 8. Correlation between Bribery and Agency  Attributes in Boliviaa
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Source.  Kaufmann,  Mehrez and Gurgur (2002).
a. The graph reports the correlation across public agencies  between the indicated  performance measure (on the
vertical  axis) and the indicated agency attribute (on the horizontal axis),  based on a survey of public officials in
Bolivia. Transparency refers to the average  of six questions relating to the openness of decision making procedures
in each agency  Citizen voice or feedback refers to the average of four questions regarding  the presence of formal
feedback mechanisms available to users of the institution. Wage level satisfaction refers to the fraction of
respondents  who rated their compensation  as satisfactory.  Each dot depicts a public agency, averaged across the
public officials respondents for each institution.
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